The predictive social brain: On the processing of other people's behaviour by Heil, L.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/194086
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2019-06-02 and may be subject to
change.
T
H
E
 P
R
E
D
IC
T
IV
E
 S
O
C
IA
L
 B
R
A
IN
: O
N
 T
H
E
 P
R
O
C
E
S
S
IN
G
 O
F
 O
T
H
E
R
 P
E
O
P
L
E
’S
 B
E
H
A
V
IO
U
R
 
Lieke H
eil
331
ISBN 978-94-6284-156-7
Lieke Heil
THE PREDICTIVE 
SOCIAL BRAIN
ON THE PROCESSING OF  
OTHER PEOPLE’S BEHAVIOUR
PSM 20180528 Proefschrift Lieke Heil OM.indd   Alle pagina's 17-07-18   15:31
UITNODIGING
Voor het bijwonen 
van de openbare verdediging 
van mijn proefschrift
The predictive social brain: 
On the processing of other 
people’s behaviour
Op donderdag 13 september 2018 
om 12.30 uur precies
in de aula
van de Radboud Universiteit, 
Comeniuslaan 2 te Nijmegen 
Lieke Heil
l.heil@donders.ru.nl
Paranimfen
Johanna van Schaik
johannavanschaik@gmail.com
Ezgi Kayhan
ezgikayhan@gmail.com
PSM 20180528 Proefschrift Lieke Heil UN.indd   1 17-07-18   09:23
The predictive social brain: 
On the processing of other people’s behaviour
Lieke Heil
PSM 20180528 Proefschrift Lieke Heil BW.indd   1 17-07-18   15:10
© 2018, Lieke Heil
ISBN: 978-94-6284-156-7
Cover design: Ron Zijlmans
Lay-out: RON Graphic Power, www.ron.nu
Printing: ProefschriftMaken || www.proefschriftmaken.nl
All rights reserved. No parts of this publication may be reported or transmitted, in any of form or  
by any means, without the permission of the author. 
PSM 20180528 Proefschrift Lieke Heil BW.indd   2 17-07-18   15:10
The predictive social brain: 
On the processing of other people’s behaviour
Proefschrift
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor
aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen
op gezag van de rector magnificus prof. dr. J.H.J.M. van Krieken,
volgens besluit van het college van decanen
in het openbaar te verdedigen op
donderdag 13 september 2018
om 12.30 uur precies
door
Lieke Heil
geboren op 5 mei 1987
te Deurne
PSM 20180528 Proefschrift Lieke Heil BW.indd   3 17-07-18   15:10
Promotor  
Prof. dr. H. Bekkering
Copromotor
Dr. I.J.E.I. van Rooij
Manuscriptcommissie
Prof. dr. F.P. de Lange
Prof. dr. R.W. Holland
Dr. S. Quadflieg (University of Bristol, Verenigd Koninkrijk)
PSM 20180528 Proefschrift Lieke Heil BW.indd   4 17-07-18   15:10
Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction 7
Chapter 2 One wouldn’t expect an expert bowler  
to hit only two pins: hierarchical predictive processing  
of agent-caused events 19
Chapter 3 Processing of prediction errors in mentalizing areas 47
Chapter 4 Biased person performance models: how ingroup overestimation  
persists in the face of outgroup individuation 63
Chapter 5 Predictions in action observation:  
the role of causal interpretation 77
Chapter 6 Summary and discussion 93
Appendices 105
References 107
Nederlandse samenvatting 115
Dankwoord 119
Curriculum vitae 121
Publications 123
PSM 20180528 Proefschrift Lieke Heil BW.indd   5 17-07-18   15:10
PSM 20180528 Proefschrift Lieke Heil BW.indd   6 17-07-18   15:10
1
Introduction
PSM 20180528 Proefschrift Lieke Heil BW.indd   7 17-07-18   15:10
CHAPTER  1
8
PSM 20180528 Proefschrift Lieke Heil BW.indd   8 17-07-18   15:10
INTRODUCTION 
9
1
In our daily social interactions, we see other people performing a wide range of actions. 
Imagine, for instance, watching a friend preparing dinner. You see her cutting vegetables, 
heating up a pan on the stove and stirring a sauce. In the meantime, you are processing 
all this information: you might wonder what your friend is doing, what you could do to 
help and if the dish she is cooking will turn out to taste good or not. Fortunately, your 
brain will be able to provide all sorts of information to help you understand the situation 
quickly. It might help you remember what happened the last time she made dinner and 
activate world knowledge about different flavours, cooking techniques and common 
ways to prepare food. Therefore, for instance, you might almost instantly realize that she 
would like you to add some of the salt she is pointing at to the sauce or you might expect 
a very tasty meal because you know that your friend is a good cook who is using quality 
ingredients and materials. 
In a situation like the one described here, as well as in many other situations, we 
continuously process information on the behaviour of others in order to understand what 
they are doing and why they are doing this. Although we usually do this without even 
realizing, this ability is key to successful social interaction and, ultimately, survival. It not 
only helps us understand what is happening around us, but it also helps us predict what 
will happen next and select our own actions accordingly, often even before the other 
person’s action is completed. Although the ease with which we do all this in our daily 
lives makes it seem so simple, we are only starting to understand how our brains enable 
the social-cognitive processes involved. Many different sources of information need to be 
integrated in order to understand why a person performs an action and anticipate his or 
her next action. This understanding depends, for instance, on what we know about the 
previous behaviour of that person, the social group they belong to, and the context in 
which the action is performed. A better understanding of the processes involved would 
not only improve our general understanding of the brain, but also that of conditions 
that cause people to experience difficulties in processing other people’s actions, such as 
autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and schizophrenia.  
A promising framework for explaining the neural mechanism underlying action 
understanding and the speed at which we do this is the predictive processing framework. 
In this thesis, I will explore whether this framework is indeed able to account for different 
aspects of action processing. To this end, this introduction will discuss what is currently 
known about the way in which people process and understand other people’s actions 
and how the predictive processing framework may relate to other accounts of social-
cognitive processing, before introducing the studies reported in this thesis. 
PSM 20180528 Proefschrift Lieke Heil BW.indd   9 17-07-18   15:10
CHAPTER  1
10
NEURAL MECHANISMS FOR PROCESSING OTHER PEOPLE’S ACTIONS
Different neural mechanisms have been proposed to be involved in action understanding. 
One very influential proposal involves the mirror neuron system. Mirror neurons are 
neurons that fire not only when actions are performed, but also when those actions 
are observed (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004), in line with William James’ idea that “every 
mental representation of a movement awakens to some degree the actual movement 
which is its object” (1890). Support for the existence of this type of neurons was first 
found in premotor and parietal areas in macaque monkeys (Di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, 
Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992; Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, 
Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996) and later also in the human supplementary motor area and 
medial temporal lobe (Mukamel, Ekstrom, Kaplan, Iacoboni, & Fried, 2010). In addition to 
this direct evidence for mirror neurons, more indirect support comes from neuroimaging 
studies that have found areas, typically in inferior parietal and inferior frontal parts of 
the brain, in which activation is elicited during both performance and observation of 
actions (Gazzola & Keysers, 2008; Iacoboni et al., 1999; Kilner, Neal, Weiskopf, Friston, & 
Frith, 2009; Molenberghs, Cunnington, & Mattingley, 2012). Mirroring accounts of action 
understanding suggest that the mirror neuron system supports action understanding 
by matching observed behaviour to the motor representations used to perform the 
same behaviour. In other words, by ‘mirroring’ the actions of others, we automatically 
understand them ‘from the inside’ (Iacoboni et al., 2005; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 
2001; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). 
The pattern of activation in another set of brain areas has inspired an alternative 
account of action understanding. The so-called mentalizing or theory-of-mind network 
typically includes areas outside of the motor system, such as the medial prefrontal 
cortex (mPFC), temporoparietal junction (TPJ), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and 
superior temporal sulcus (STS), and seems to be involved in attributing mental states 
like thoughts, beliefs and desires to other people (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Carrington & 
Bailey, 2009; Fletcher et al., 1995; Frith & Frith, 2006; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). According 
to mentalizing accounts of action understanding, we understand other people’s actions 
not by simply matching them to our own actions, but by reasoning about the beliefs and 
mental states of these other people. Support for this account came from studies showing 
increased neural activity in areas in the mentalizing network when an observed action 
occurs in an implausible context (Brass, Schmitt, Spengler, & Gergely, 2007), when it is 
performed with a deceptive intent (Grèzes, Frith, & Passingham, 2004), or when people 
reflect on its intentionality (De Lange, Spronk, Willems, Toni, & Bekkering, 2008). 
Importantly, several attempts have been made to integrate the mirroring and 
mentalizing accounts of action understanding (De Lange et al., 2008; Keysers & Gazzola, 
2007; Kilner, 2011; Uddin, Iacoboni, Lange, & Keenan, 2007; Van Overwalle & Baetens, 
2009). These attempts converge on the idea that actions can be understood at different 
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levels and that mirroring processes seem to operate at lower levels than mentalizing 
processes. For instance, if you see someone giving someone else a gift, you might realize 
what this person is doing and how this person is doing this (i.e. handing over a gift by 
moving his hand towards the other person) and at the same time also why the person 
is doing this (i.e. to make the other person happy). Whereas mirroring processes seem 
to be involved in understanding the ‘how’ and potentially the ‘what’ or immediate goal 
of an action (Hamilton & Grafton, 2006), mentalizing processes seem to be involved in 
understanding the ‘why’ or the intention of the action (Spunt & Lieberman, 2012, 2013). 
As understanding the intention behind an action requires knowing which action was 
performed, mirroring processes seem to inform mentalizing processes. This suggests 
a hierarchical organization in which the immediate goal of an action occupies a lower 
level than its intention. As such, the complementary accounts of action understanding 
may be accommodated in the predictive processing framework (Kilner & Frith, 2008), an 
account that is receiving an increasing amount of attention and promises to reconcile not 
only social-cognitive but also other types of processing in a unifying theory (Clark, 2013b; 
Friston, 2005, 2010; Hohwy, 2013). 
PREDICTIVE PROCESSING OF OBSERVED ACTIONS
Whereas traditional mirroring accounts tend to describe action understanding as a 
primarily bottom-up process in which sensory input of observed actions is passively 
matched to motor representations of actions observers could perform themselves, 
the predictive processing framework stresses its top-down nature instead. Although 
this framework was recently proposed as a unifying framework for brain functioning 
(Clark, 2013b; Friston, 2005, 2010; Hohwy, 2013), it was initially coined to describe visual 
perception (Lee & Mumford, 2003; Rao & Ballard, 1999). According to hierarchical predictive 
processing, we do not perceive something because sensory input is transformed into a 
perceptual interpretation or representation, but rather because this sensory input was 
correctly predicted by an internal generative model. For example, as you know that 
your friend is preparing a spicy curry, your generative model may generate a prediction 
that the red object she just took from a bowl is a chilli pepper. This prediction is sent 
from high levels that represent rather abstract knowledge about objects and contexts 
down to more low-level perceptual areas in the brain. If the object is indeed a pepper, 
no further processing is required and you indeed perceive it as a pepper. If, however, the 
object is actually an apple, the prediction is not correct and sensory prediction errors 
arise. They are sent from lower levels to the levels above, in order to adjust (e.g. the 
value assignments for variables in) the generative models until ultimately, the prediction 
matches the sensory input. 
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The predictive processing framework assumes that the brain operates according to 
Bayesian principles: it represents probabilities and combines priors and sensory evidence 
in ways that comply with Bayes’ theorem (Knill & Pouget, 2004). It further assumes that 
in case prediction errors arise, they require additional processing in terms of time (e.g. 
Den Ouden, Daunizeau, Roiser, Friston, & Stephan, 2010) and neural activity (e.g. Kok, 
Jehee, & De Lange, 2012) in order to be ‘explained away’, as the ultimate aim of predictive 
processing is to minimize prediction errors (Friston, 2010). In the process of explaining 
away, the match between the prediction (i.e. the prior) and the sensory evidence is 
improved. This can be done in several ways, for instance, by revising either the structure or 
parameters of the generative model or only its value assignments (Kwisthout, Bekkering, 
& Van Rooij, 2017). In this process, perception may sometimes become biased towards 
the prediction, as the process of explaining away prediction errors is not aimed at finding 
the prediction that corresponds to reality, but the prediction that best explains sensory 
evidence. The framework can therefore explain perceptual biases such as binocular 
rivalry (Hohwy, Roepstorff, & Friston, 2008) and motion illusions (Weiss, Simoncelli, & 
Adelson, 2002).
It has been proposed that the framework is able to explain not only visual perception 
(e.g. Alink, Schwiedrzik, Kohler, Singer, & Muckli, 2010; Kok et al., 2012; Spratling, 2010; 
Summerfield & Egner, 2009), but also, for instance, auditory perception (e.g. Wacongne 
et al., 2011), action (e.g. Adams, Shipp, & Friston, 2013) and interoception (e.g. Seth, 
Suzuki, & Critchley, 2012). Furthermore, it has been suggested that as a general account 
of brain functioning, it can also be extended to the rather high-level and potentially 
abstract domain of social cognition (Bach & Schenke, 2017; Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007b; 
Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013). 
In terms of action understanding, this would mean that we use our prior knowledge 
about actions that we have performed or observed before in order to create a generative 
model that provides us with predictions that are tested against the observed behaviour. 
This would lead to faster and more efficient processing of actions that are expected 
compared to those that are unexpected. Only few studies, however, have investigated 
if predictive processing indeed provides an explanation for the way in which people 
process other people’s actions. Findings that are in line with this idea are, for example, 
those showing that top-down and bottom-up signals in the brain are modulated by the 
probability of an agent-caused event (Van Pelt et al., 2016) and that knowledge about 
the intention of a reaching or withdrawing action biases the perception of its kinematics 
(Hudson, Nicholson, Ellis, & Bach, 2016). The aim of this thesis is to further explore 
whether the framework can explain behavioural and neuroimaging data of studies in 
which people build up expectations of actions and their outcomes based on, for instance, 
knowledge about the person performing the action.  
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GENERATIVE MODELS FOR ACTION PROCESSING
The predictive processing framework assumes that efficient processing depends on 
useful predictions and it is therefore of key importance to improve our understanding on 
the generative models in which they arise. Predictions about another person’s actions 
are only informative if they incorporate a wide range of knowledge. For instance, when 
we meet someone, brain areas involved in representing their physical appearance are 
linked to areas representing their character traits (Greven, Downing, & Ramsey, 2016) 
and when we process the action of this person, we consider these characteristics, but 
also the context in which the action is performed and the objects involved. If we assume 
that predictive processing provides us with a correct understanding of brain functioning, 
then all these kinds of knowledge should be represented in our generative models and 
exert their influence on cognitive processing. 
Individual person information in generative models
In order to make meaningful predictions about actions, generative models first need to 
represent knowledge about individual persons. In the example where you observe your 
friend preparing a meal, knowing that your friend is an experienced cook who especially 
likes Indian food will influence your expectation of whether the curry will turn out to 
taste good or not. Based on, for instance, previous experience with a person, we build up 
expectations about their character traits and skills. According to predictive processing, 
violation of these expectations should result in prediction errors that require additional 
processing in order to be explained away. In line with this idea, previous studies have 
found that when people read descriptions about another person, neural activity 
increases when a second description of their behaviour is not in agreement with the trait 
suggested in the first description (Dungan, Stepanovic, & Young, 2016; Ma et al., 2011; 
Mende-Siedlecki, Cai, & Todorov, 2012). It is unknown, however, whether knowledge 
about a person’s characteristics also influences the processing of online observation of 
the actions performed by this person. If this is indeed the case, then the observation 
of actions or outcomes that are unexpected given knowledge about the person should 
result in prediction errors, which require additional processing as they are explained 
away in brain areas involved in social-cognitive processing.  
Social group information in generative models
The generative model also needs to be able to represent knowledge about different 
social groups. If, in our cooking example, you would not observe a friend but someone 
you have not met before, you would still have certain expectations based on the social 
group the person belongs to. For instance, you might expect a person from India to cook 
a better curry than someone from Germany or a person that seems similar to you to cook 
a dish that you are familiar with. This is because we tend to attribute character traits 
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based on knowledge about social groups, such as stereotypes. These character traits 
may then guide our predictions about a person’s behaviour (Westra, 2017). The idea that 
information about the social group of a person is integrated in the generative model 
that provides predictions about that person’s actions, is in line with previous studies 
showing that the way in which we categorize people into social groups influences how 
we perceive their appearance and actions (for an overview, see Otten, Seth, & Pinto, 2017; 
Xiao, Coppin, & Van Bavel, 2016) and that stereotype-incongruent information requires 
additional neural processing (Quadflieg et al., 2011). 
There are many ways in which people categorize themselves and others into social 
groups and one person may be part of many groups at the same time. One very simple 
and common way to categorize others is by ‘ingroup’ and ‘outgroup’. If people consider 
someone a member of their our own social group, they tend to evaluate them more 
positively (Otten & Moskowitz, 2000; Van Bavel & Cunningham, 2009) and act more 
prosocially towards them (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). Importantly, this 
grouping has been found to influence the way in which information about other people is 
processed. For instance, people are better at recognizing faces of members of their own 
group (Bernstein, Young, & Hugenberg, 2007) and judge hand movements performed 
by members of their own group to be faster than those performed by members of the 
other group (Molenberghs, Halász, Mattingley, Vanman, & Cunnington, 2013). In addition, 
when people view faces of members of an ingroup the amplitude of the face-sensitive 
N170 ERP component (Golby, Gabrieli, Chiao, & Eberhardt, 2001) and activation in the 
fusiform gyrus as well as other brain areas (Ratner & Amodio, 2013; Van Bavel, Packer, 
& Cunningham, 2008) increases. These findings suggest that whether the observed 
person is part of one’s own or another social group is integrated in the generative model. 
Although a better understanding could be informative for a range of social psychological 
and societal issues, it is unknown how the generative models for ingroup members 
exactly differ from those of outgroup members.
Causal information in generative models 
In order to provide useful predictions, the generative model further needs to represent 
knowledge about the causal structure of the world. It needs to distinguish, for example, 
between causal and non-causal predictive cues. Causes have a higher predictive value and 
it therefore seems likely that they play a key role in the generative models underlying our 
predictions about action outcomes. If you predict the quality of food, the kitchen in which 
it is prepared might be a useful predictive cue. However, it is not a causal factor, whereas 
a cue informing you whether the person preparing it is a professional chef or not, on the 
other hand, is a causal factor. As such a causal factor is usually a better predictor of future 
events, distinguishing between causal and non-causal factors may therefore be very 
helpful. Conceivably, this distinction arises because knowledge about causal structures 
influences what we learn. As we have suggested earlier (Heil, van Pelt, Kwisthout, van 
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Rooij, & Bekkering, 2014), this would also explain why people only learn to associate a tone 
with an air puff if they are aware of the link between the two (Clark & Squire, 1998) and why 
the blocking effect in conditioning depends on by whether people believe that an event is 
a possible cause or a possible effect of another event (Waldmann, 2000). 
Another helpful distinction can be made between causes and enabling factors 
(Cheng & Novick, 1991). In our cooking example, whether your friend manages to prepare 
a nice meal will not only depend on her own actions, but also on the ingredients and 
materials she uses. Even if she is a very good cook, if she uses vegetables that lack taste, 
the curry will probably not turn out that well. Although your friend’s actions cause the 
outcome (i.e. a prepared meal), the quality of the ingredients and materials is an enabling 
factor in this situation. In terms of the generative model, this model should thus be able 
to represent both direct causal and enabling factors. It is unknown, however, how these 
factors may be represented.   
ASSOCIATIVE ACCOUNTS OF ACTION PROCESSING
In addition to predictive accounts, associative and Hebbian accounts have been 
suggested to provide an explanation of how people process the actions of others. These 
accounts assume that relatively simple learning rules may underlay the development of 
mirror neurons (e.g. Giudice, Manera, & Keysers, 2009; Heyes, 2010; Keysers & Gazzola, 
2014). 
The associative sequence learning (ASL) theory was initially proposed as a theory 
about the emergence of imitation (Heyes & Ray, 2000) and developed into an explanation 
of how mirror neurons may have acquired their mirroring properties as a result of 
sensorimotor experience (Catmur, Walsh, & Heyes, 2007, 2009). In short, it assumes that 
associations are learned and that whether an association between events is learned 
depends on their contiguity (i.e. occurrence close together in time) and contingency (i.e. 
the degree to which one events predicts the other; Cook, Bird, Catmur, Press, & Heyes, 
2014) in line with the Rescorla-Wagner model (Cooper, Cook, Dickinson, & Heyes, 2013; 
Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). On the other hand, Keysers and Gazzola (2014) suggest that this 
learning depends on Hebbian principles, including temporal precedence, causality and 
contingency. At a neural level, Keysers and Perrett (2004) suggest that neurons acquire 
their mirroring properties due to consistent and repeated firing during observation as well 
as production of actions, which increases the efficiency between pre- and postsynaptic 
cells in a network of mirroring areas. 
Both of these theories focus on how learning from experience can shape the neural 
systems involved in action understanding. The sensorimotor associations created could 
then function in either a bottom-up or a top-down fashion. Whereas a top-down type of 
processing would be in line with the predictive processing framework, other accounts, 
PSM 20180528 Proefschrift Lieke Heil BW.indd   15 17-07-18   15:10
CHAPTER  1
16
including classical mirror neuron theories (e.g. Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010), may rely on 
a primarily bottom-up type of processing instead. 
OUTLINE OF THIS THESIS
In this thesis, I will investigate whether the predictive processing framework is able to 
explain different social-cognitive processing involved in understanding and predicting 
other people’s actions. More specifically, I will report on a series of studies exploring the 
potential nature of the generative models underlying predictions, which are also referred 
to as cognitive or person performance models. In all of these studies, we used a bowling 
paradigm in which participants viewed animated movies of people playing a bowling 
game. Based on different types of information, such as knowledge about the player, 
they could build up predictions of the score and we assumed that violations of these 
predictions would result in prediction errors. In chapter 2, I report on a study in which 
we investigated whether knowledge about the skill level of an individual player is used in 
the processing of his actions. More specifically, in this study, we developed a predictive 
processing model with a hierarchical structure and causal relations between its levels 
and investigated whether this model was able to explain the pattern of reaction times 
to questions regarding the player or the score. In chapter 3, I will describe an fMRI study 
in which we tested whether unexpected action outcomes resulted in additional neural 
activity involved in the explaining away of prediction errors and whether this activation 
would overlap with activation in brain areas typically associated with social-cognitive 
processes. In chapter 4, I will then report on a study in which we consider whether 
generative models of another person’s task performance differ between ingroup and 
outgroup whether they distinguish between individuals in both ingroup and outgroup. 
Chapter 5 will describe a study focusing on how knowledge about different types of 
causal factors in the environment may be represented in a generative model. Finally, 
in chapter 6, the findings will be summarized and their theoretical implications will be 
discussed.
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One wouldn’t expect an expert bowler 
to hit only two pins: hierarchical predictive processing 
of agent-caused events
based on: Heil, L., Kwisthout, J., Van Pelt, S., Van Rooij, I., & Bekkering, H. (2018). 
One wouldn’t expect an expert bowler to hit only two pins: Hierarchical predictive 
processing of agent-caused events. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. 
Advanced online publication. doi:10.1177/1747021817752102. 
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ABSTRACT 
Evidence is accumulating that our brains process incoming information using top-
down predictions. If lower-level representations are correctly predicted by higher-level 
representations, this enhances processing. However, if they are incorrectly predicted, 
additional processing is required at higher levels to ‘explain away’ prediction errors. 
Here, we explored the potential nature of the models generating such predictions. More 
specifically, we investigated whether a predictive processing model with a hierarchical 
structure and causal relations between its levels is able to account for the processing 
of agent-caused events. In Experiment 1, participants watched animated movies of 
‘experienced’ and ‘novice’ bowlers. The results are in line with the idea that prediction 
errors at a lower level of the hierarchy (i.e. the outcome of how many pins fell down) slow 
down reporting of information at a higher level (i.e. which agent was throwing the ball). 
Experiments 2 and 3 suggest that this effect is specific to situations in which the predictor 
is causally related to the outcome. Overall, the study supports the idea that a hierarchical 
predictive processing model can account for the processing of observed action outcomes 
and that the predictions involved are specific to cases where action outcomes can be 
predicted based on causal knowledge.
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INTRODUCTION
When we observe the actions of another person, we predict what this person is going 
to do next in order to decide what his or her aim is and to adapt our own response 
accordingly. To do this, we take the characteristics of this observed person into account. 
Imagine, for example, that you see a florist reaching for a vase. You could decide to offer 
help by handing it to him so he can use it to put flowers in. If, on the other hand, you see 
a small child reaching for the same vase, your prediction of the potential outcome will 
tell you that this might not be such a good idea, so you can intervene with the child’s 
action and put the vase at an unreachable location. Previous research supports the idea 
that in order to interact with the world effectively, we use information from previous 
experiences to predict a specific visual stimulus (Den Ouden, Friston, Daw, McIntosh, & 
Stephan, 2008; Summerfield & Koechlin, 2008) or the outcomes of other people’s actions 
(Aglioti, Cesari, Romani, & Urgesi, 2008). In the current chapter, we explore the idea that 
predictions about the outcomes of other people’s actions arise in a generative model 
that has a hierarchical structure and consists of causal relations between different levels 
of this hierarchy.
This idea has its origin in the predictive processing framework. According to this 
framework, the brain is continuously predicting the input it will receive (Clark, 2013b; 
Friston, 2005). This means that our brains process incoming information not in a purely 
bottom-up fashion, but by a cascade of predictions from higher-level to lower-level 
representations. The top-down neural signal then consists of predicted states of the 
world and the bottom-up signal consists of the difference between these predictions and 
the actual input. These differences are called prediction errors. The framework assumes 
that if lower-level representations are correctly predicted by higher-level representations 
this enhances processing, e.g. in terms of speed (O’Reilly et al., 2013). However, when 
lower-level representations are incorrectly predicted, additional processing at higher 
levels is required to deal with the prediction errors arising at lower levels. 
In recent years, empirical evidence has been found to support the idea that the 
predictive processing framework successfully describes low-level sensory processing 
(e.g. Bastos et al., 2012; Kok et al., 2012; Phillips, Blenkmann, Hughes, Bekinschtein, & 
Rowe, 2015; Rao & Ballard, 1999; for a review see Summerfield & De Lange, 2014). Some 
researchers have pressed that predictive processing may serve as a general account 
of brain functioning (e.g. Clark, 2013b; Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2013) in which case it 
should also describe processing at higher cognitive levels, including those involved 
in the processing of agent-caused events. Indeed, it has been suggested that neural 
responses to biological motion and other people’s beliefs and desires are modulated by 
the predictability of an event, in compliance with the features of predictive processing 
(Kilner et al., 2007b; Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013). In accordance with this idea, top-down 
and bottom-up signals in the brain have been found to be modulated by the probability 
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of an agent-caused event (Van Pelt et al., 2016). Yet, little is known still about the 
potential cognitive principles that govern the prediction of action outcomes from agent 
information. In the current chapter, we test whether a hierarchical predictive processing 
model is, in principle, able to account for the way in which we process the outcomes of 
other people’s actions. We specifically explore a model in which the predictive relations 
between levels of the generative model are causal. 
To study our hypothesis in a naturalistic but controlled setting, we used a behaviou-
ral paradigm in which participants viewed animated movies of people playing a bowling 
game. In these movies, the agent’s action (i.e. throwing a bowling ball) caused an 
outcome (i.e. the pins were knocked down). In Experiment 1, the specific outcome (i.e. 
the score) could be predicted based on identification of the agent, i.e. knowledge about 
the performance of this agent on previous trials. There were two agents, indicated as 
the novice and the experienced player, who usually obtained a low and a high score 
respectively. In 25% of all trials however, players obtained scores that were incongruent 
with their skills. According to the model that we explore here, such an incongruence results 
in a prediction error at the level of the hierarchy at which ‘outcome’ is represented. In 
the current bowling set-up, this prediction error should increase processing at the higher 
level of the hierarchy at which the ‘agent’ is represented, as this is where the prediction 
error needs to be ‘explained away’. To investigate the idea of a hierarchically organised 
model, we asked participants to report after each movie either which agent (‘experienced’ 
or ‘novice’) or which outcome (‘high score’ or ‘low score’) they observed. For each of 
these two questions, reaction times were compared for questions following predicted 
versus unpredicted outcomes. Reaction times have previously been found to correlate 
with the improbability of an event (Bestmann et al., 2008; Den Ouden et al., 2010) and 
are therefore assumed to reflect the prediction error. Given the predictive processing 
model that we investigate here, we hypothesise that the observation of an unpredicted 
outcome slows down the response to a question about the agent, as the prediction error 
arising at the outcome level is to be explained away at the agent level, requiring additional 
processing at that level and thereby slowing down the reporting of the inferred agent 
information. In other words, we predicted a longer reaction time for the agent question if 
it followed an unpredicted rather than a predicted outcome, as a prediction error needs 
to be explained away at this level. On the other hand, as a prediction error is assumed 
to be explained away at a level above, not at the level at which the error occurs itself, a 
prediction error occurring specifically at the outcome level is not expected to influence 
the reaction times for the outcome question. In this way, measuring reaction times for 
these questions affords us to test the hypothesis of a hierarchically structured predictive 
model in which information about agents is processed at a higher level in this model than 
information about outcomes. 
Furthermore, we explored the role of knowledge about the causal structure of the 
world in the prediction of the outcomes of agent-caused events. Predicting what types of 
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outcomes are likely produced by what types of agents presupposes a generative model 
that encodes such world knowledge. This knowledge tells us that some agents have a 
propensity to cause some events more often than others. For instance, a skilled bowler 
is more likely to hit a strike than a novice bowler. Also, we know that agents may cause 
certain events but not others. A person may cause an object to fall, but not the sun to 
shine. This seems to be mainly the result of knowledge about the mechanisms that cause 
events (Shultz, Fisher, Pratt, & Rulf, 1986). The influence of this type of knowledge also 
explains why young children are more likely to expect the movement of an object to be 
caused by an agent rather than a by a train (Saxe, Tzelnic, & Carey, 2007), why people only 
learn to associate a tone with an air puff if they are aware of the link between the two 
(Clark & Squire, 1998), and why the remembered speed of a movement is influenced by 
the effect it seems to have caused in Michotte’s (1963) launching effect paradigm (Kerzel, 
Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000). 
To investigate the hypothesis that a predictive processing model with causal relations 
between the levels is able to account for the type of processing that occurs at high levels of 
the hierarchy where agent-caused events are represented, we compare the results of this 
first experiment to the results of two follow-up experiments. Whereas in Experiment 1 the 
outcomes of actions (number of pins thrown over by an agent) could be predicted based 
on knowledge about the agent (his propensity to throw high or low scores), in Experiment 
2 we created a situation in which the outcome could only be predicted from a coloured 
patch next to the agent. Colours, unlike agents, do not cause outcomes. Therefore, if the 
predictions made in Experiment 1 were specifically based on causal knowledge of agents 
causing outcomes, none of the effects predicted for Experiment 1 would be predicted for 
Experiment 2. In Experiment 3, the predictive cue was the agent’s shirt colour. Given that 
according to world knowledge a shirt colour can be a cue to an agent’s identity, we would 
again expect the same reaction time effects in Experiment 3 as predicted for Experiment 
1. On the other hand, if the predictions in all experiments would be merely based on 
non-causal associations between two events, one would expect similar patterns for all 
experiments. The set of three experiments together allows us to explore whether or not 
a hierarchical predictive processing model with causal rather than non-causal relations 
between the levels can account for the processing of other agents’ actions. As such, we 
hope our results will open the way for future research on this topic. 
EXPERIMENT 1
Methods
Participants
Twenty-eight healthy, right-handed participants (22 female) between the ages of 
18 and 26 (mean age 22.6) were recruited for the first experiment. They were paid 10 
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euros or received course credits for their participation. The study was approved by the 
institution’s local ethics committee and written informed consent was obtained from 
each participant. 
Stimuli and design
A total of 24 animated movies of a bowling game was created using Autodesk’s 3ds Max 
2014 and MotionBuilder 2014 (www.autodesk.com). These movies showed a bowling 
lane and one of two agents, who could be recognised by their clothing. The avatars for 
the bowling players were selected from Worldviz Vizard Complete Characters (www.
worldviz.com/products/avatars/complete-characters). In each movie, the agent threw a 
ball directed at the pins and disappeared at 1200 ms after the start of the movie, in order 
to keep the visual display of the action outcome the same for the two agents. The ball 
then rolled towards the pins, either a little left or right of the centre and hit 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 
or 8 pins. The kinematics of the ball movement only varied in terms of the direction and 
was not associated with a specific agent or outcome. Each movie lasted 5 seconds. By 
keeping the kinematics of the action constant, we were able to investigate predictions 
that are based on information about the agent, rather than on kinematics. In 75% of all 
288 trials, the outcome was as expected based on the agent’s skill level. This means that 
one agent, who was introduced to the participants as the novice player, received a low 
score (1, 2, or 3) in 108 out of 144 trials, whereas the other agent, who was introduced 
to the participants as the experienced player, received a high score (6, 7, or 8) in 108 out 
of 144 trials. More specifically, within the category of low scores, a score of 2 was most 
frequent (96 out of 144 trials), as was a score of 7 in the category of high scores (Figure 1). 
The other outcomes (i.e. 1, 3, 6, and 8) were included as fillers that provided variability 
in scores and thereby made the experiment more realistic. The movies were presented 
using Presentation software (version 17.2, www.neurobs.com).    
Procedure
Participants were seated comfortably in front of the computer on which the experiment 
was presented. Instructions were presented on the screen and shortly repeated verbally. 
In the instructions, it was explained to participants that there were two agents, a novice 
and an experienced player, who usually (but not always) obtained scores that matched 
their skill level. In addition, participants were told that after each movie, they would be 
asked to answer one out of two questions, and that they should pay attention to everything 
they saw, as they would not know which question would be asked afterwards. They were 
also instructed to answer the question as quickly as possible. After the instructions, the 
participants performed four practice trials, in which they received information about 
which agent they would see, before the movie was presented. This allowed them to 
associate appearance of the agent with his skill level, as they would need this to perform 
the task. Immediately after each movie of the actual task, participants were asked to 
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answer one out of two questions, which were presented in random order. One of the 
questions was about the agent (‘Did you see the experienced or the novice player?’), 
whereas the other question was about the outcome (‘Was the score high or low?’). The 
question was presented on the screen for two seconds, with the two answer options 
presented underneath. Participants answered by using their index fingers to press either 
the left button or the right button on a button box as quickly as possible. The order of 
the answer options was randomised to prevent motor preparation. In the practice trials, 
participants received feedback on the accuracy of their answer. This was not the case in 
the actual experiment. After each trial, a fixation cross was presented for a duration that 
was randomised between 500 and 2500 milliseconds. 
Reaction times to the questions that followed movies in which the outcome was 2 
or 7 were analysed using a 2 (agent: novice vs. experienced player) × 2 (outcome: 2 vs. 
7) × 2 (question: agent vs. outcome) repeated measures ANOVA. The reaction times to 
questions that were answered incorrectly were not considered in this analysis. As all 
responses given after 2000 ms were labelled incorrect, our final dataset did not include 
any trials with very long reaction times. The data were checked for trials very short 
reaction times (< 100 ms), but no such trials were found. Furthermore, reaction times to 
questions following movies with outcomes 1, 3, 6, and 8 were also not considered in the 
analysis, as they were included as fillers in the experiments to make the events look as 
naturalistic as possible and appeared very infrequently (a total of 32 out of 288 trials). 
Based on our hypothesis that additional processing is required at the agent level as a 
result of a prediction error, we anticipated that unexpected events (i.e. the novice agent 
obtaining a high score or the experienced agent a low score) would bring about longer 
Figure 1. Overview of conditions and stimuli in Experiment 1.
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reaction times than expected events (the novice agent obtaining a low score or the 
experienced agent a high score). This results in an anticipated interaction effect between 
agent and outcome, specifically for the agent question. 
Results and discussion
The analysis showed a significant 3-way interaction between agent, outcome, and 
question, F(1, 27) = 7.41, p = .01, ηp
2 = .22 (Figure 2). Follow-up analyses showed that for 
the agent question, there was an interaction between agent and outcome, F(1, 27) = 18.95, 
p < .001, ηp
2 = .41. More specifically, paired-samples t-tests showed that, for this question, 
unexpected events resulted in higher reaction times for both the novice player, t(1, 27) 
= -4.00, p < .001, and the experienced player, t(1, 27) = 2.60, p = .02. Overall, participants 
were on average 46.8 ms slower to respond when the outcome was not as would be 
predicted from the agent’s skills, in line with the hypothesis that unexpected events 
result in a longer reaction time than expected events as a result of additional processing 
at the agent level. Such an effect did not appear when participants were asked about 
the outcome, where there was no interaction between agent and outcome, F(1, 27) = .80, 
p = .38, ηp
2 = .03. For this question, there only was a significant effect of outcome on reaction 
time F(1, 27) = 19.36, p < .001, ηp
2 = .42. More specifically, a score of 7 resulted in a reaction 
time that was on average 36.9 ms longer than the reaction time following a score of 2. 
Figure 2. Reaction times (mean ± SEM) for the agent question (A) and the outcome question (B) in 
Experiment 1, separately for bowler expertise and outcome (score 2 and 7).
Additional analyses confirmed that including the questions following movies that showed 
another outcome (i.e. 1, 3, 6, and 8) did not influence this pattern of results. Furthermore, 
the average accuracy over all trials was 95.2% (94.6% for the agent question and 95.8% 
for the outcome question) and the specific pattern of these data was incompatible with 
the possibility that the reaction time effects were driven by a speed-accuracy trade off. 
The 3-way interaction shows that the prediction effects differ between the two 
questions. As participants were not aware which question they would be asked after 
A B
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each movie, it is unlikely that they made predictions in one situation, but not in the other. 
Rather, it seems that specifically for the agent question, reaction times were influenced by 
the violation of the participant’s prediction. This is consistent with the idea that prediction 
errors at the lower level of the processing of the causal hierarchy, i.e. the outcome level, 
slow down the reporting of information at a higher level, i.e. the agent level. 
In this first experiment, predictions about the outcome of another person’s action 
could be based on a causal relation between the agent and the outcome. To investigate 
the specificity of this type of prediction to this causal relation, we performed a second 
experiment in which the score could not be predicted based on the agent’s skills, but 
on an arbitrary statistical relation between a coloured box next to the agent and the 
outcome. If people’s predictions indeed crucially depend on causal knowledge about 
agents causing outcomes, no effect on reaction times of predictability of events should 
be observed in Experiment 2.
EXPERIMENT 2
Methods
Participants
Twenty-eight participants (23 female) between the ages of 19 and 29 (mean age 23.1) 
took part in the second experiment. They were paid 10 euros or received course credits 
for their participation. The study was approved by the local ethics committee and written 
informed consent was obtained from each participant.
Stimuli and design
Out of the 24 animated movies from the first experiment, 12 movies with only one of the 
agents were selected. This means that there were still two ball directions (left and right) 
and six outcomes (1, 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8). Instead of two different agents, there were now 
two different coloured boxes (yellow and blue). In each movie, one of these boxes was 
presented next to the agent. Like the agent, the box was presented from the beginning 
of the 5-second movie and disappeared after 1200 milliseconds. The colour of the box 
correlated with the outcome. If one colour was presented the outcome was likely to be 
low, whereas if the other colour was presented the outcome was likely to be high. The 
distribution of trials was the same as in the first experiment, with 288 trials in total, of 
which 75% was as expected based on the colour of the box (Figure 3). 
Procedure
The testing procedure was similar to the procedure for the previous experiment. Although 
the instructions were also largely the same, participants were now told that they would 
see a blue or yellow box that would indicate if the score is more likely to be high or low. As 
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an example, they were told that one of the colours might indicate that the player would 
probably get a low score, but that this would not always be the case. Again, participants 
were explicitly informed about the association between the colour and the outcome 
during the four practice trials. The questions that followed each movie were about the 
colour (‘Was the box blue or yellow?’) and the outcome (‘Was the score high or low?’). As 
in the first experiment, reaction times to the questions were measured using a button 
box and analysed using a 2 (colour: blue vs. yellow) × 2 (outcome: 2 vs. 7) × 2 (question: 
colour vs. outcome) repeated measures ANOVA.
Results and discussion
Unlike in the previous experiment, no significant 3-way interaction between colour, 
outcome, and question was found, F(1, 27) = .27, p = .61, ηp
2 = .01 (Figure 4). There was 
also no interaction between colour and outcome, F(1, 27) = 2.68, p = .11, ηp
2 = .09. The 
analysis only showed an interaction between colour and question, F(1, 27) = 4.33, 
p = .05, ηp
2 = .14. To test whether this pattern of results differed from that in Experiment 1, 
an additional repeated measures ANOVA was run with the same variables as before 
and experiment as a between-subjects factor. This analysis showed a significant 4-way 
interaction between colour/agent, outcome, question and experiment, F(1, 54) = 4.89, 
p = .03, ηp
2 = .08, confirming the difference between the experiments. 
As in the previous experiment, additional analyses confirmed that including the 
questions following movies that showed another outcome (i.e. 1, 3, 6, and 8) did not 
influence this pattern of results. Also, there was no indication that the effects were driven 
by a speed-accuracy trade off and the average accuracy over all trials was 96.6% (96.2% 
for the agent question and 97.0% for the outcome question).
Figure 3. Overview of conditions and stimuli in Experiment 2.
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The results do not provide evidence that participants use the correlation between 
the coloured box and the outcome to predict the outcome. Whereas in Experiment 1, the 
correlation between an agent’s skill and an outcome had a causal interpretation (i.e. an 
experienced (or novice) player is more likely to cause an high (or low) score outcome), the 
correlation between colour and outcome in Experiment 2 did not have a natural causal 
interpretation (i.e. according to our world knowledge, colours in and of themselves have 
no causal powers to make pins fall down). The difference between these experiments 
is in line with the idea that predictions during action observation depend on the causal 
relation between the predictor and the outcome. However, before concluding that the 
processing of action outcomes indeed crucially depends on causal knowledge about 
agents causing outcomes, we need to rule out alternative explanations. In Experiment 1, 
participants were supposed to infer the agent’s identity from his shirt colour in order to 
answer the agent question. In other words, to distinguish the novice and the experienced 
agent, participants could not just focus on directly observable cues, as they could for 
distinguishing the two colours in Experiment 2. To investigate if this difference between 
the experiments may account for the findings, we conducted a third experiment in which 
the questions focused only on directly observable information from the movies. 
EXPERIMENT 3
Methods
Participants
Thirty-three participants (31 female) between the ages of 19 and 28 (mean age 22.2) 
took part in this experiment. The sample size was calculated based on the data from 
Experiment 1, with the assumption that the more implicit causal relation between the 
Figure 4. Reaction times (mean ± SEM) for the colour question (A) and the outcome question (B) 
in Experiment 2, separately for shirt-colour cue (indicative of low or high outcome) and outcome 
(score 2 and 7).
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colour and the outcome would result in a smaller effect size (it was set at 50% of that of 
Experiment 1). One participant was excluded from the analyses because the pattern of 
accuracy for the agent question (i.e. 86.5% correct for the expected outcome versus 15.6% 
correct for unexpected outcome) suggests that she misunderstood the instructions. As 
in the previous experiments, participants were paid 10 euros or received course credits 
for their participation. The study was approved by the local ethics committee and written 
informed consent was obtained from each participant.
Stimuli and design
This experiment was almost exactly the same as Experiment 1 in terms of stimuli and 
design. We used the same 24 animated movies and there were 288 trials, with a similar 
distribution as in the previous experiments. 
Procedure
The procedure used in this experiment was similar to the procedure in Experiment 1. 
The only difference was in the instructions and the questions that were asked after each 
movie. As we did not want to instruct participants to think about two different agents 
with different skill levels, we only told them to pay attention to the colour of the agent’s 
shirt without mentioning that there may be different agents. It was explained to them 
that the colour of the shirt would indicate if the score was more likely to be high or low and 
thus, that one colour would indicate that the score would probably be low and the other 
colour that the score would probably be high, although this would not be always the case. 
Again, the association between the colour and the outcome was mentioned explicitly 
in the practice trials, but not in the actual experiment. After each movie, participants 
answered a question about the shirt colour (‘Was the shirt purple or white?’) or about the 
outcome (‘Was the score high or low?’). Reaction times to the questions were measured 
using a button box and analysed using a 2 (shirt colour: white vs. purple) × 2 (outcome: 
low vs. high) × 2 (question: shirt colour vs. outcome) repeated measures ANOVA. Trials 
were excluded from the analysis in the same way as in the previous experiments. There 
was one trial in which the reaction time was below 100 ms, but as it was only one, it was 
not excluded from the analysis.  
Results and discussion
Results of the analysis show a 3-way interaction between shirt colour, outcome, and 
question, F(1, 31) = 4.21, p = .05, ηp
2 = .12, as in Experiment 1 (Figure 5). Follow-up analyses 
showed that for the colour question, there was a significant interaction between colour 
and outcome, F(1, 31) = 7.07, p = .01, ηp
2 = .19. In paired-samples t-tests, unexpected 
events were found to result in higher reaction times for the colour associated with a 
low score, t(1, 31) = -4.28, p < .001, but not for the colour associated with a high score, 
t(1, 31) = .17, p = .87. Overall, for the colour question, the reaction time to a question 
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following an unexpected event was 26.1 ms longer than to a question following an 
expected event. For the outcome question, there was no interaction between colour and 
outcome, F(1, 31) = 0.33, p = .57, ηp
2 = .01. For this question, there was a significant effect 
of outcome on reaction time F(1, 31) = 12.29, p < .01, ηp
2 = .28. A score of 7 resulted in a 
reaction time that was on average 28.2 ms longer than the reaction time following a score 
of 2. This pattern of results resembles that of Experiment 1. A repeated measures ANOVA 
with the variables from the previous analysis as well as experiment (1 vs. 3) as a between-
subjects factor indeed showed no 4-way interaction between agent/colour, outcome, 
question, and experiment, F(1, 58) = 0.67, p = .42, ηp
2 = .01.
Again, additional analyses confirmed that including the questions following movies 
that showed another outcome (i.e. 1, 3, 6, and 8) did not influence this pattern of results. 
As in the other experiments, there was no indication that the effects were driven by a 
speed-accuracy trade off and the average accuracy over all trials was 96.5% (95.2% for 
the agent question and 97.7% for the outcome question).
So even though participants were not explicitly instructed about different agents 
with different skill levels, the pattern of results for this experiment is very similar to 
that of the first experiment. This suggests that the difference between the first two 
experiments was not simply caused by the fact that one of the questions in Experiment 1 
was about the agent, which was not directly observable, whereas in Experiment 2, both 
questions were about directly observable factors. In Experiment 3, like in Experiment 
2, the questions focus on colour and outcome, both of which are directly observable. 
The pattern of results, however, resembles that of Experiment 1.  This is in line with the 
idea that in both Experiments 1 and 3, colour is used as a cue to the agent’s identity and 
the outcome is then predicted based on this identity. According to this idea, a causal 
relation between predictor (agent) and predicted (outcome) is crucial for predicting the 
outcomes of other people’s actions.  
Figure 5. Reaction times (mean ± SEM) for the colour question (A) and the outcome question (B) 
in Experiment 3, separately for shirt-colour cue (indicative of low or high outcome) and outcome 
(score 2 and 7).
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To test the idea that predictions enhance processing in terms of speed, we ran 
an additional analysis in which we compared the overall reaction times for all three 
experiments, using a one-way ANOVA. This analysis indicated that the average reaction 
times differed significantly between the experiments, F(2, 85) = 5.16, p < .01, ηp
2 = .11. 
Bonferroni-corrected post hoc comparisons revealed that the average reaction time in 
Experiment 2 (M = 798.8 ms, SD = 124.57) was significantly higher than in Experiment 3 (M 
= 693.81 ms, SD = 108.87), p < .01, whereas the average reaction times for Experiment 2 
were higher than for Experiment 1 (M = 715.64 ms, SD = 159.52), although this difference 
was only marginally significant, p = .06. For Experiment 1 and 3, reaction times did not 
differ significantly, p = 1. 
Although the questions answered in the three experiments were different, the 
length and difficulty of the questions in Experiment 2 cannot account for these findings. 
Rather, the differences in reaction times between the experiments seem to suggest 
that predictions that participants made in Experiment 1 and 3 allowed them to respond 
quickly, whereas the inability of participants to use the relation between colour and 
outcome to predict the outcome in Experiment 2 resulted in a longer reaction time. This 
in line with the idea that predictions speed up cognitive processing.  
DISCUSSION
In a series of experiments, we investigated whether a predictive processing model is, in 
principle, able to account for the way in which we process the outcomes of other people’s 
actions. More specifically, we explored a model in which predictions arise in a generative 
model that has a hierarchical structure and consists of causal relations between different 
levels of this hierarchy. The present results support the idea that such a model can 
account for this type of processing. To further improve the interpretation of the data, we 
developed a computational characterisation of this hierarchical predictive processing 
model in order to assess to what extent the present experiments’ qualitative pattern of 
results is consistent with our theoretical assumptions. A detailed formal description of 
this characterisation and the associated processes can be found in the appendix. Here, 
we will briefly explain the characterisation (for a simplified version, see Figure 6), before 
outlining the relation with the experimental findings. 
Crucially, the model consists of three levels (agent, outcome and visual input), hierar-
chically ordered from top to bottom. Predictions are sent from higher to lower levels. 
This means that the visual input (i.e. the actual configuration of pins falling down) is 
ultimately predicted based on the observed shirt colour, through predictions at the 
outcome and agent levels. The relations between the three levels are causal in nature 
(black arrows), whereas the relationship between colour and agent (dashed arrow) is 
deterministic. This deterministic relation indicates that the colour of the agent’s shirt 
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can be used to identify the agent. This identification then drives a prediction for the most 
probable outcome (two versus seven pins), which in turn drives predictions about which 
exact pins will fall down. 
Bottom-up input at the lowest level (i.e. a visual stimulus) that is not fully predicted 
generates prediction errors. These prediction errors represent information about the 
input that was not already anticipated (Rao & Ballard, 1999) and are instrumental in 
updating the hypothesis (explaining away the prediction error) at a higher level. In the 
predictive processing framework, these prediction errors are weighted, which means 
that top-down and bottom-up information is balanced by altering the gain on specific 
prediction error units (Clark, 2013a; Friston & Kiebel, 2009). The prediction error that 
arises at the level of visual input, and is processed at the outcome level above it, carries a 
very low weight because of the irreducible uncertainty in this information. This irreducible 
uncertainty stems from the fact that each outcome is inherently associated with many 
potential configurations of visual input (e.g. there are many ways in which two out of ten 
pins can fall down). As a result of this low weight, little additional processing is going on 
at the outcome level even if some prediction errors arise at the visual level below. On 
the other hand, the prediction error that is sent to the agent level carries more weight, 
as the relation between agent and outcome has much more reducible uncertainty and 
thus allows for updating. Therefore, the discrepancy between the predicted and the 
perceived outcome (i.e. the number of pins hit) will lead to additional processing at the 
agent level to explain away the high prediction error. Presumably, this takes time and 
as a consequence, when participants answer a question that calls for information from 
this level, the reaction time increases monotonically with the size of the prediction error 
at the level below. In this case, the increase in reaction time reflects ‘explaining away’ 
of the prediction errors by updating the hypothesis about the current situation. More 
informally, we could say that when participants observe an experienced player hitting 
only a few pins, their prediction that the outcome is most probably high is violated, 
leading to a relatively high prediction error, but this prediction error can be explained 
away based on the knowledge that unpredicted outcomes occur every now and then. 
Figure 6. A simplified version of our precise characterisation of hierarchical predictive processing.
Agent Colour
Outcome
Visual
input
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After the prediction error is explained away, the information represented at this level can 
be read and the question can be answered. 
With this model in mind, we will now take a closer look at the experimental results. In 
Experiment 1, we found that prediction errors at the lower (outcome) level indeed slowed 
down reporting of information at the higher (agent) level. This is consistent with the idea 
that the generative model created to predict human actions is structured hierarchically, 
as we assume that prediction errors are sent upwards from lower levels to higher levels, 
increasing reaction times at this higher level as they are explained away. Given that only 
responses to the agent question and not the outcome question were influenced, a non-
hierarchical representation of the generative model now seems less plausible.
In two follow-up experiments we investigated the idea that, at high levels of the 
hierarchy where agent-caused events are represented, the predictive relations between 
levels of the generative model have a causal representation. In Experiment 1, participants 
could use their knowledge about the agent to predict the outcome of a bowling action. 
A novice player was expected to obtain a low score, whereas an experienced player was 
expected to obtain a high score. The relation that is learned here could be represented 
as a causal one: based on general knowledge about the world, we know that agents 
cause outcomes. So when participants learned which agent usually got which scores 
in the bowling game, they could use this knowledge to base their prediction about the 
outcome on. In case this knowledge about agents and the causal structure of the world 
would not be important, one would expect that changing the agent information to 
another informative cue would result in the same pattern of reaction times. Therefore, 
in the second experiment, we used a cue with the same predictive probabilities as 
the agent. It has previously been suggested that predictions are based on simple 
associations and the contiguity and contingency between a cue and an outcome 
determine whether a prediction will be made (Keysers & Gazzola, 2014). Contiguity 
describes the paired occurrence of the cue and the outcome, whereas contingency 
implies that one event (i.e. the colour cue or the agent) reliably predicts the other (i.e. 
the outcome). Thus, the contiguity and contingency between the cue and the outcome 
were exactly the same in all three experiments. The second experiment differed from 
the other experiments in terms of the type of relation that could be learned. Here, this 
relation was not a causal one between an agent and an outcome, but a purely stochastic 
one between a colour and an outcome. In terms of the model presented in Figure 6, 
predictions about action outcomes cannot be based on a colour since this colour is not 
intrinsically linked to an agent, as the representation of colour does not have a causal 
relation with the representation of the outcome at the level below. This is in agreement 
with a suggestion that we have made elsewhere (Heil et al., 2014): the degree to which 
two events are associated can be guided by beliefs about the causal structure of the 
world. For example, people can only be conditioned to blink their eyes when they hear 
a tone in case they are aware of the relation between the tone and a puff of air to the 
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eye that caused them to blink (Clark & Squire, 1998). In the same way, Waldmann (2000) 
found that the blocking effect in conditioning (i.e. the effect that the association of an 
event A with event Y is prevented if A is presented together with another event B that has 
previously been associated with event Y) is modulated by whether the participants were 
led to believe that A and B were either possible causes or possible effects of Y. It seems 
that awareness of a causal relation between two events influences the way in which 
these events are processed: if people do not interpret two events as causally related, 
they are not as easily associated, as is the case when an arbitrary colour correlates 
with a certain outcome in our bowling setting. We therefore suggest that the lack of a 
causal interpretation in Experiment 2 results in a pattern of reaction times that does not 
distinguish between predicted and unpredicted outcomes, even though participants 
were made aware that there was a statistical relation between the colour of the box and 
the outcome.
In Experiment 3, participants could again base their predictions on a causal relation 
between an agent and an outcome, but this experiment was designed to control for some 
of the differences between the two previous experiments. We used the same stimuli as 
in the first experiment, but asked the participants to answer questions about directly 
observable features, as in the second experiment. Next to reporting the outcome, 
participants reported the colour of the agent’s shirt. Similar to Experiment 1, reaction 
times to the colour question (which is comparable to the agent question) were again 
influenced by predictions about the outcome. These findings are in line with the idea 
that the brain’s predictive model of other agent’s actions consists of causal relationships 
between different levels in a hierarchy. 
Previous studies investigating the role of causality in cognitive processing already 
showed that whether or not two events are perceived to be causally related depends 
on prior knowledge. This knowledge may, for example, concern the causal mechanism 
(Shultz et al., 1986), the probability that a causal relation exists or the assumed functional 
form (i.e. deterministic or probabilistic) of this relation (Griffiths, Sobel, Tenenbaum, & 
Gopnik, 2011). Importantly, the current study extends these findings by showing that if 
events are perceived to be causally related, this allows for the prediction of one event 
based on the other, which then enhances cognitive processing. It seems that the world 
model that we use to predict other people’s actions and their outcomes revolves around 
causes and their effects.
This does not mean that it is impossible to make predictions based on arbitrary cues. 
Previous studies actually showed prediction effects for arbitrarily associated events 
(e.g. Kok et al., 2012). Conceivably, in the clearly non-arbitrary setting that we created 
in our experiment relevant world knowledge is activated, whereas this is not the case 
for studies in which arbitrary events are associated. For example, in the study by Kok 
et al. (2012), an auditory cue was the only source of information available to predict the 
orientation of the visual stimulus. The richness of information in our experiments may 
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have made it more difficult to associate an arbitrary cue with an action outcome. This 
potential difference in the associations that are learned in arbitrary versus non-arbitrary 
settings demonstrates the importance of naturalistic, ecologically valid experimental 
designs in which a causal relation can be inferred. For example when studying hierarchical 
predictive processing of agent-caused events, as we do here, it is important to take into 
account that the structure of the hierarchy may depend on the causal relation between 
agent and outcome. We suggest that knowing that agents cause outcomes allows us to 
predict an outcome based on knowledge about the agent. 
Importantly, predictive processing is assumed to enhance processing in terms of 
speed. A comparison between the overall reaction times in the different experiments 
indeed revealed that in cases in which we found that participants were able to predict 
the outcomes (i.e. Experiments 1 and 3), processing was speeded up compared to cases 
in which we found no evidence for these predictions (i.e. Experiment 2). This is in line with 
the idea that predictions enhance processing in terms of speed and shows the potential 
benefit of predictive processing as a more general mechanism.  
Although our results show that the predictive processing framework is able to 
account for reaction time effects in the processing of another person’s action outcomes, 
it is also important to consider possible alternative explanations. For instance, in contrast 
to predictive processing, other accounts may not assign a key role to predictions and 
prediction errors. An example of such a non-predictive explanation would be an account 
in which probabilistic inference takes place only after the observation of the events. One 
could, for instance, hypothesise that the inference of a less probable event requires more 
processing time than inference of a more probable event, resulting in a longer reaction 
time for an agent that is not probable given the outcome. Such an account can be sub-
stantiated, however, only insofar as there is a plausible mechanism that explains why 
lower probability events take longer to process. Even if this is granted, such an account 
would need to make additional assumptions to explain the exact pattern of results. For 
example, without additional assumptions, the account cannot explain the difference 
between the two questions, as both need to be inferred and both deal with a similar 
pattern of low and high probability. 
However, it is important to note that many models of cognition may actually be 
integrated in the predictive processing framework. For example, claims arising from 
associative theories, such as the associative sequence learning model, do not necessarily 
oppose those of the predictive processing framework. Press, Heyes, and Kilner (2011) 
argue that the associative sequence learning model explains how relations are learned, 
whereas predictive processing explains how learned relations support inferences about 
other people’s actions. In this sense, the two models complement each other since they 
simply address different questions. 
Future research is needed to investigate if a predictive processing model with a 
hierarchical structure and causal relations between its levels can also account for 
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different types of cognitive processing. Also, it would be interesting to further disen-
tangle the different processes that may underlie explaining away of the prediction 
error. In case of hypothesis updating, the probability distribution over the candidate 
hypotheses is reassessed while the generative model remains stable. On the other 
hand, revision of the generative model, sensory sampling to obtain more information 
on the unpredicted event, and active inference have been proposed as alternative 
ways to bring prediction and sensory input closer together (Kwisthout et al., 2017). For 
example, if the relation between a certain agent and a certain outcome changes in the 
course of an experiment (e.g. when the novice bowler gets better), participants need to 
revise their model.
APPENDIX
In this section, we present a precise computational characterisation of predictive 
processing that makes insightful how the data can be interpreted. It allows us to assess 
to what extent the qualitative pattern of results of the described experiment is consistent 
with our assumptions about hierarchical predictive processing. The computational 
characterization has several components: an information structure and a set of com-
putational processes that operate on this information structure, in line with the proposal 
in Kwisthout et al. (2017). Below we will describe both the general computational model 
and the task-specific instantiation of this computational model.
General information structure
In the predictive processing account, the brain continuously predicts its inputs in a 
cascade of probabilistic predictions from higher-level cognitive representations to 
lower-level sensory inputs. The information structure that we use in our computational 
characterisation of this account is a set of causal Bayesian networks Bij. Each network 
Bij describes a generative model, i.e. a probabilistic relation between possible causes 
(at level i) and predicted consequences of these causes (at level j). In our computational 
characterisation, the causal Bayesian networks consist of a set of hypothesis nodes 
(denoted by Hyp; jointly representing a set of possible causes), a set of prediction nodes 
(denoted by Pred; jointly representing a set of possible consequences), and a set of other 
nodes (denoted by Int; representing contextual influences and modulating complex 
dependences between Hyp and Pred) (Figure A1). In the hierarchy, the prediction nodes 
Pred in network Bij, representing level j of the hierarchy, are identified with the hypothesis 
nodes Hyp that drive predictions (at level k) in network Bjk. The network further consists 
of a set of (discrete) conditional probability distributions, representing the strengths of 
the stochastic relationships in the network.
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The arcs in the network can have a causal interpretation, that is, an arc from node 
A to node B represents that A is a possible cause of B. The hypothesis nodes are source 
nodes (have no incoming arcs within one level of the hierarchy) and the prediction nodes 
are sink nodes (have no outgoing arcs within one level of the hierarchy). 
Task-specific information structure
The task-specific information structure that we use to characterise the experimental 
setting of Experiments 1 and 3 represents a hierarchy with three levels: Agent (level 1), 
Outcome (level 2), and Visual Input (level 3) as depicted in Figure A2. The structure thus 
consists of two networks B12 and B23 and contains the following nodes: B12 = {Hyp = {Agent}, 
Pred = {Outcome}, Int = {Colour}} and B23 = {Hyp = {Outcome}, Pred = {Visual input}, Int = 
∅}. With these networks we associate the following conditional probability distributions: 
{P(Colour), P(Colour | Agent), and P(Outcome | Agent)} and {P(Outcome), P(Visual input | 
Outcome)}, respectively. The variables Agent, Outcome, and Colour are all binary, with 
Agent taking the values ‘experienced’ and ‘novice’, Outcome taking the values ‘2’ and 
‘7’, and Colour taking the values ‘white’ and ‘purple’. The variable ‘Visual input’ takes as 
values every possible combination of any subset of the ten pins, that is, {∅, {1}, {2}, …, 
{1,2}, {1,3}, …, {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10}}. The cardinality of this variable is 1 + (109 ) + (
10
8 )+ … + (
10
1 ) 
+ 1 = 1024. The conditional probabilities are as follows: P(Colour) is uniformly distributed, 
P(Colour | Agent) is deterministic, P(Outcome = 2 | Agent = novice) = 0.75, P(Outcome = 7 
| Agent = novice) = 0.25, P(Outcome = 2 | Agent = experienced) = 0.25, and P(Outcome = 
7 | Agent = experienced) = 0.75. The conditional probability distributions P(Visual input 
| Outcome = 2), respectively P(Visual input | Outcome = 7), are such that a combination 
Figure A1. Illustration of the general information structure where the stochastic dependencies 
between two levels are mediated by a Bayesian network, consisting of hypothesis variables (the 
set Hyp), prediction variables (the set Pred), and intermediate variables that represent contextual 
effects or that model complex structural dependencies between hypotheses and predictions.
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of other than two pins (respectively seven pins) falling over has a probability of zero and 
the probability of any combinations of two pins (respectively seven pins) is uniformly 
distributed over the  (102 ) = 45 (respectively  (
10
7 ) = 120) possible combinations. 
In Experiment 2, we disassociate ‘colour’ and ‘agent’. This is reflected in our model by 
the conditioning of Outcome on Colour, rather than Agent on Colour. The causal relation 
between Agent and Outcome is still in place – as outcomes are caused by agents – but 
as there are no ways for participants to recognise the expert and the novice player, 
the statistical dependence of the various outcomes on the agent is de facto absent. 
We assume in our model that the absence of the causal relation between Agent and 
Outcome makes it much harder to learn the statistical regularities in the experiment. 
There is no a priori (on the basis of world knowledge) causal relation between Colour 
and Outcome; there is only an artificially created experimental association. This requires 
the participants to ‘unlearn’ the expectation that there is no effect (leading to a uniform 
prediction of Outcome given Colour) in the course of the experiment, and learn the 
statistical association in the experiment. This is in contrast with Experiments 1 and 3 
where there is a causal relation between Agent and Outcome, where the shirt’s colour 
is an indication of the Agent and thus relevant for determining the expected Outcome.
Figure A2. The Bayesian networks connecting the Agent and Outcome levels (top left panel A for 
Experiments 1 and 3, with Colour as contextual variable influencing Agent; bottom left panel B for 
Experiment 2, with Colour as contextual variable influencing Outcome) and the Outcome and Visual 
Input levels (right panel C). The conditional probability distributions in the left network are given 
in the figure. The conditional probability distributions associated with these networks are given in 
the text.
Agent Colour
Outcome
Agent
ColourOutcome
Outcome
Visual
input
A
B
C
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Computational processes (general)
On the information structure described above, we define the following computational 
processes: Prediction (computing the prediction, i.e. the posterior probability dis-
tribution for the Pred nodes), ErrorComputation (computing the prediction error, i.e. 
the divergence between the predicted and observed distribution for the Pred nodes), 
and ExplainingAway (minimizing prediction error, i.e. computing an alternative prior 
probability distribution over the Hyp nodes that minimises the divergence between 
predicted and observed distribution for the Pred nodes). We now formally explicate 
these computational processes as follows:
Prediction
Input: A causal Bayesian network B as specified above.
Output: The posterior probability distribution P(Pred) over the prediction nodes Pred.
ErrorComputation
Input: A predicted probability distribution P(Pred) and an observed probability 
distribution P’(Pred) over a set of prediction nodes Pred.
Output: The prediction error δ(P’(Pred), P(Pred)), defined as the result of a component-
wise subtraction of the two probability distributions, i.e. ∀i P’(Pred = i) – P(Pred = i). 
Explaining Away
Input: A causal Bayesian network B as specified above, including a prior probability 
distribution P(Hyp) over the hypothesis nodes Hyp and a prediction error δ(P’(Pred), 
P(Pred)).
Output1: A revised prior probability distribution P’(Hyp) = P(Hyp | Pred) × P’(Pred).
In addition, we need to define the following concepts. The size of the prediction error 
δ(P’(Pred), P(Pred)) is the Kullback-Leibler-divergence DKL(P’(Pred) || P(Pred)) =  Σi P’(Pred 
= i) × log2 (P’(Pred = i) / P(Pred = i)). We define the precision of the prediction error as w 
× DKL(P’(Pred) || P(Pred)), where w is defined as the weight of the prediction error (Clark, 
2013). It represents a measure on the amount of reducible uncertainty in B; if there is a 
high confidence that B is a faithful representation of the actual stochastic dependences 
between Hyp and Pred, then the prediction error carries only information regarding the 
irreducible uncertainty that is inherent in the environment.
1 Note that the predictive processing account assumes that only the prediction error δ(P’(Pred), P(Pred)) [and not 
P’(Pred) itself] is processed in the process of explaining away prediction errors. However, as we can always recover 
P’(Pred) from B and δ(P’(Pred), P(Pred)), the given input-output mapping is not underdefined.
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Computational processes (task-specific)
The computational processes defined above are concretised as follows on the task-
specific information structure:
Prediction
Input: B12, respectively B23, as described above.
Output: For B12, the posterior probability distribution P(Outcome) = P(Outcome | Agent) × 
P(Agent | Colour) × P(Colour); for B23, the posterior probability distribution P(Visual input) 
= P(Visual input | Outcome) × P(Outcome).
ErrorComputation
Input: P(Outcome) and P’(Outcome) = P’(Outcome | Visual input) × P’(Visual input), 
respectively P(Visual input) and P’(Visual input)).
Output: δ(P’(Outcome), P(Outcome)), respectively δ(P’(Visual input), P(Visual input)). 
Explaining Away
Input: B12, respectively B23, as described above; δ(P’(Outcome), P(Outcome)), respectively 
δ(P’(Visual input), P(Visual input)).
Output:  P’(Agent) = P(Agent | Outcome) × P’(Outcome), respectively P’(Outcome) = 
P(Outcome | Visual input) × P’(Visual input).
The weights w12, respectively w23, of the prediction error δ(P’(Outcome), P(Outcome)), 
respectively δ(P’(Visual input), P(Visual input)), represent the confidence in B12, 
respectively B23. We make the assumption that the confidence in the generative model 
that relates agents to outcomes is less than the confidence in the generative model 
that relates outcomes to visual stimuli: the agent-outcome relationship is learned 
over the course of the experiment, whereas participants have a lifetime experience 
with the conceptual interpretation ‘two pins fall down’ of a particular visual stimulus 
where two pins fall down. Prediction errors in B23 represent irreducible uncertainty, i.e. 
uncertainty that is inherent to the stochastic relation between outcomes and visual 
stimuli. Therefore, the prediction errors should not lead to revision of the generative 
model. Given that there is much more reducible uncertainty (and thus a lower precision) 
in the prediction error at the B12 level, the weight of the prediction error is higher at the 
B12 level than at the B23 level. We therefore assume that w12 is much higher than w23 and 
that the weighted prediction errors are lower in B23 than they are in B12. As the reducible 
uncertainty in the prediction error at the outcome level in this experiment is even higher 
than in Experiments 1 and 3, we assume that the weight of the prediction errors w12 is 
considerably higher in Experiment 2.
PSM 20180528 Proefschrift Lieke Heil BW.indd   41 17-07-18   15:10
CHAPTER  2
42
Example calculation
On observation of the colour of the player’s shirt (purple) the participant expects the 
experienced player. For this player, the predicted outcome will be P(Outcome = 7) = 
P(Outcome = 7 | Agent = experienced) × P(Agent = experienced | Colour = purple) × 
P(Colour = purple) + P(Outcome = 7 | Agent = novice) × P(Agent = novice | Colour = purple) 
× P(Colour = purple) = 0.75 × 1 × 1 + 0.25 × 0 × 0 = 0.75. Likewise, P(Outcome = 2) = 0.25 × 1 × 
1 + 0.75 × 0 × 0 = 0.25. Assuming a uniform probability over all visual stimuli that match the 
outcome, the prediction for the visual input P(Visual input) = P(Visual input | Outcome = 7) 
× P(Outcome = 7) + P(Visual input | Outcome = 2) × P(Outcome = 2). Given that P(Outcome 
= 7) = 0.75 and that P(Outcome = 2) = 0.25, this will generate a probability of 0.0063 for 
each of the 120 combinations of 7 pins, and 0.0056 for each of the 45 combinations of 2 
pins. In contrast, when the white shirt is observed, giving an expectation for the novice 
player, the predicted outcome would be P(Outcome = 7) = 0.25 and P(Outcome = 2) = 0.75, 
and P(Visual input) would be 0.0021 for each of the 120 combinations of 7 pins, and 0.0167 
for each of the 45 combinations of 2 pins. On observing the actual visual input (that is, 
a particular combination of 2 or 7 pins falling down), the KL divergence is computed to 
be 5.91, 8.91, 7.49, and 7.32 for the conditions {novice agent, outcome 2; novice agent, 
outcome 7; experienced agent, outcome 2; experienced agent, outcome 7}. This means 
that the prediction error is higher for situations in which the outcome is 7 as compared 
to those in which the outcome is 2, as the number of possible combinations in which the 
pins can fall down is higher for an outcome of 7 than for an outcome of 2. For parsimony, 
we assume the simplest mathematical relationship between the prediction error and 
reaction time: the processing time of explaining away prediction errors (as indexed by 
the reaction time) increases monotonically, but not necessarily linearly, with the size 
of the prediction error. Then, the expected qualitative pattern of the reaction times for 
these four experimental conditions is consistent with the weighted prediction errors at 
the B12 level as depicted in Figure A3, left panel. The inferred outcome (either P(Outcome 
= 2) = 1 or P(Outcome = 7) = 1, depending on the actual visual stimulus) is compared 
with the predicted outcome (either P(Outcome = 2) = 0.25 and P(Outcome = 7) = 0.75, or 
P(Outcome = 2) = 0.75 and P(Outcome = 7) = 0.25, depending on whether the experienced 
or the novice agent is observed). This gives a KL divergence of 0.425, 2, 2, and 0.425 for 
the conditions {novice agent, outcome 2; novice agent, outcome 7; experienced agent, 
outcome 2; experienced agent, outcome 7}. The expected qualitative pattern of reaction 
times for these four experimental conditions is consistent with the weighted prediction 
errors at the B23 level
2, as is depicted in Figure A3, right panel.
2 Note that other aspects than weighted prediction errors also influence the reaction times. For example, as it takes 
longer for seven pins to fall down compared to two pins, it also takes longer for the participant to infer the actual visual 
input.   
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In Figure A4 the expected pattern of the reaction times is given, based on the weighted 
prediction errors that follow from the model describing Experiment 2. As described 
above, we anticipate that there will be a much weaker association between box colour 
and outcome and a higher weight of the prediction error. Both are due to the artificial 
(experimental) relation between box colour and outcome that forces the participants to 
unlearn their expectation that there is no effect of box colour. The main consequence 
thereof is that the weighted prediction errors will be overall higher than in Experiments 
1 and 3, and that the effect of colour on outcome will be much weaker than the effect of 
agent (or colour) on outcome in Experiment 1 (or 3).
Figure A3. The expected reaction time (on a unit scale) for the four experimental conditions in 
Experiments 1 and 3, based on the weighted prediction errors at B12 (A) and at B23 (B).
Figure A4. The expected reaction time (on a unit scale) for the four experimental conditions in 
Experiment 2, based on the weighted prediction errors at B12 (A) and at B23 (B).
A B
A B
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Conclusion
We presented a computational characterisation of hierarchical predictive processing to 
deepen our understanding of the qualitative pattern of the results of the experiments. The 
pattern of results for the experiments shows a 3-way interaction for Experiment 1 and 3, 
with an interaction between agent and outcome only for the agent (or colour) question, 
and no such interaction for Experiment 2. This is in line with the patterns shown in Figure 
A3 and A4. Hence, the results can be explained with the proposed characterisation of 
hierarchical predictive processing.
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Processing of prediction errors in mentalizing areas
Based on: Heil, L., Hartstra, E., Kwisthout, J., Van Pelt, S., Van Rooij, I., & 
Bekkering, H. (submitted). Processing of prediction errors in mentalizing areas. 
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ABSTRACT
When seeing people perform actions, we are able to quickly predict the action’s out-
comes. These predictions are not solely based on the observed actions themselves, but 
utilize our prior knowledge of others. It has been suggested that observed outcomes that 
are not in line with these predictions result in prediction errors, which require additional 
processing in order to be ‘explained away’. However, there is no consensus on whether 
this is indeed the case for the kind of high-level social-cognitive processes involved 
in action observation. In this fMRI study, we investigated whether observation of 
unexpected action outcomes causes additional activation in line with the processing of 
prediction errors and if so, whether this activation overlaps with activation in brain areas 
typically associated with social-cognitive processes. In the first part of the experiment, 
participants watched animated movies of two people playing a bowling game, one 
experienced and one novice player. In cases where the player’s score was higher or 
lower than expected based on their skill level, there was increased BOLD activity in areas 
that were also activated during a theory of mind task that participants performed in 
the second part of the experiment. These findings are discussed in the light of different 
theoretical accounts of human social-cognitive processing. 
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INTRODUCTION
In our day-to-day social interactions, we collect information about people around us. 
For instance, we might remember that one person is very knowledgeable, while another 
person is good at playing tennis. We use this information to build up expectations of the 
behaviour of other people and the outcomes of their behaviour. We will therefore be 
more likely to ask our knowledgeable friend to join our pub quiz team, as this person will 
probably answer more questions correctly. This way, prior knowledge about others helps 
us understand the world and correctly respond to events. 
This importance of prior knowledge is in line with the idea that predictions play a 
key role in cognitive processing. For instance, it has been suggested that predictions aid 
efficient processing as expected events are perceptually facilitated while unexpected 
events result in prediction errors, which require additional processing in order to be 
‘explained away’ (Clark, 2013b; Friston, 2010; Rao & Ballard, 1999; Summerfield & De 
Lange, 2014). That is, when the unexpected events might be explained by a priori unlikely 
causes, then the prediction error can be minimized by assuming that such an unlikely 
cause indeed is in place, as this best explains the unlikely event. For rather low-level 
cognitive processes, such as visual perception, unexpected events have indeed been 
found to result in additional processing as indexed, for instance, by increased reaction 
times (Berti & Schröger, 2004; O’Reilly et al., 2013) and brain activity (Kok et al., 2012; 
Summerfield, Trittschuh, Monti, Mesulam, & Egner, 2008).
Although there is no consensus that prediction errors also arise when people process 
more abstract, social information, several findings do suggest that this is the case. Koster-
Hale and Saxe (2013) review evidence that both neural and behavioural responses to 
observed actions depend on whether this action is expected or unexpected. For instance, 
reaction times slow down when people observe another person holding an object with 
an incorrect grip (Bach, Knoblich, Gunter, Friederici, & Prinz, 2005; Van Elk, Van Schie, & 
Bekkering, 2009). In addition, areas that are part of the brain’s mentalizing network show 
increased activity in response to unexpected actions. The mentalizing network includes 
the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), the superior temporal sulcus (STS) and the medial 
prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and is assumed be involved in mental state inference (Frith & 
Frith, 2006). Top-down and bottom-up signals in both TPJ and mPFC are modulated by 
the probability of an agent-caused event (Van Pelt et al., 2016) and brain activity in these 
and related areas increases when observed actions are not in line with a person’s facial 
expression (Vander Wyk, Hudac, Carter, Sobel, & Pelphrey, 2009), with the properties of 
the object on which the action is performed (Bach, Gunter, Knoblich, Prinz, & Friederici, 
2009; De Lange et al., 2008), with the request to cooperate (Shibata, Inui, & Ogawa, 2011), 
or when observed actions are implausible given the context (Brass et al., 2007). 
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In most of these studies, actions and their outcomes were expected or unexpected 
based on general world knowledge about the characteristics of objects and constraints 
imposed by certain contexts rather than information about specific persons. However, 
similar effects were found in studies focusing on situations in which people build up 
expectations based on their prior experiences with a specific person. For example, in 
studies in which participants read descriptions of another person’s behaviour that were 
consistent (e.g. ‘Tolvan gave her sister a hug’) or inconsistent (e.g. ‘Tolvan gave her mother 
a slap’) with a trait suggested by a previous description (e.g. ‘Tolvan gave her brother a 
compliment’), inconsistent descriptions resulted in increased brain activity compared to 
consistent descriptions (Dungan et al., 2016; Ma et al., 2011; Mende-Siedlecki et al., 2012). 
In these studies, however, participants did not observe unexpected actions online, but 
could imagine them based on stories describing the actions. It is unknown whether the 
same effects also arise in case people use prior knowledge about a specific person to 
predict the outcome of an observed action.
The studies described so far suggest that there might be a general mechanism for 
the processing of behaviour that is unexpected given prior knowledge a specific person, 
involving the explaining away of prediction errors. In case there is indeed such a general 
mechanism, then we might expect that the processing of observed action outcomes that 
are unexpected given our prior experiences with the person performing the action would 
also result in increased processing. Indeed, in the study discussed in chapter 2, we found 
that responses to questions slow down when people see that the outcome of another 
person’s action is not as would be expected based on prior experiences, suggesting that 
prediction errors play a role in the processing of these events. As this was a behavioural 
study, we could not determine in which brain areas this additional processing takes place. 
Therefore, we set out to test whether the processing of action outcomes that are 
expected or unexpected based on our knowledge about a person also causes addi-
tional activation in line with the processing of prediction errors. Furthermore, we 
investigated whether such additional activity would arise in brain areas encompassing 
the mentalizing network, which is  associated with higher social-cognitive processes. In 
case brain activation related to unexpected action outcomes would be found to overlap 
with activation in brain areas typically associated with social-cognitive processes, this 
would support the idea that prediction errors do not only arise at lower, more perceptual 
levels, but also at higher, more abstract levels.
In this fMRI study, participants watched animated movies of two people playing 
a bowling game, one experienced and one novice player. Assuming that unexpected 
events would result in prediction errors that require additional processing in order to 
be explained away, we hypothesized that in cases where the player’s score was higher or 
lower than expected based on their skill level BOLD activity would increase. Moreover, 
based on the idea that prediction errors do not only drive low-level, but also more high-
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level social-cognitive processing, it was expected that this additional activity would also 
arise in brain areas traditionally associated with social-cognitive processes. 
METHODS
Participants
Thirty-five healthy, right-handed individuals with normal or corrected-to-normal vi-
sion participated in this study. Data from twelve participants were excluded: in one 
case because of low accuracy (< 85%) and in the other cases because participants were 
unable to comply with the task demands, for instance due to early discontinuation of the 
experiment or excessive head motion. This resulted in a final dataset of 23 participants 
(14 women, 9 men) aged between 18 and 28 (M = 21.91 years, SD = 2.47 years). All but 
one participant scored below the cut-off of 32 on the Dutch translation of the Autism 
Spectrum Quotient questionnaire (AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & 
Clubley, 2001; Hoekstra, Bartels, Cath, & Boomsma, 2008). Written informed consent 
was obtained from each participant and participants received course credits or twenty 
euro for participation. The study was approved by the local ethics committee (CMO Regio 
Arnhem-Nijmegen).
Stimuli
For the bowling task, 24 animated movies were created using Autodesk’s 3ds Max 2014 
and MotionBuilder 2014. Each movie showed one out of two possible bowling players 
(selected from WorldViz Vizard Complete Characters) on a bowling lane, throwing a ball 
directed at the pins at the end of the lane. The ball rolled either slightly left or slightly right 
of the centre and upon hitting the pins, 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 or 8 pins fell down. The kinematics of 
the ball movement were not related to a specific player or outcome. Each movie lasted 5 
seconds and the player disappeared after 1.2 seconds, in order to keep the visual display 
of the action outcomes the same for the two players. 
For the theory of mind task, we used the localizer task described by Dodell-Feder, 
Koster-Hale, Bedny, and Saxe (2011; http://saxelab.mit.edu/superloc.php), based on 
the initial task by Saxe and Kanwisher (2003). This task used twenty short stories either 
about a person holding a false belief or about an outdated representation, such as a map 
or photograph showing something that no longer exists. These stories were translated to 
Dutch, as all participants were native or fluent speakers of Dutch. 
All stimuli were presented using Presentation software (version 17.2, www.neurobs.
com).
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Bowling task
For the bowling task, we used a within-subject design that was similar to the one in the 
study described in chapter 2. As in that study, participants read instructions on the 
screen, explaining that they would be watching movies of two people playing a bowling 
game and answer questions about these movies. They were told that there was one 
novice and one experienced player, who usually obtained scores matching their skill 
levels. In order to allow them to associate appearance of the agent with his skill level, 
participants performed four practice trials, in which they received information about 
which agent they would see before each movie was presented. 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the procedure in the bowling task. Each trail started with 
a 5000 ms bowling movie showing either the novice or experienced player who scored either high 
or low. This movie was followed by one out of two possible questions concerning the player or the 
score. The question was presented for 2000 ms, even if participants required less time to answer it. 
Each trial ended with a fixation cross.  
In the main task there were 288 trials in total, all following the procedure shown in 
Figure 1. In 75% of all trials, movies showed the novice or experienced player obtaining 
an expected score, whereas in 25% of all trials they showed the player obtaining an 
unexpected score of at least 4 points higher or lower than their average score. More 
specifically, the novice player received a low score (1, 2, or 3) in 108 out of 144 trials, 
whereas the experienced player received a high score (6, 7, or 8) in 108 out of 144 trials. 
Within the category of low scores, a score of 2 was most frequent (96 out of 144 trials), 
as was a score of 7 in the category of high scores. The other scores (i.e. 1, 3, 6, and 8) 
appeared very infrequently (a total of 32 out of 288 trials) and were included as fillers that 
provided variability in scores, in order to make the experiment more naturalistic. 
After each movie, participants answered one out of two questions. These questions 
were written in Dutch and either asked whether they saw the experienced or the novice 
player or whether a small or a large number of pins fell down. These questions were 
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presented in random order and participants were not aware which question they would 
be asked in each trial. Each question was presented on the screen for two seconds. 
Participants were instructed to answer as quickly as possible by pressing a left or a right 
button on a button box. These buttons corresponded to two answer options presented 
underneath the question, the order of which was randomized in order to prevent motor 
preparation. Unlike in the practice trials, participants did not receive feedback on the 
accuracy of their answer. Each trial was followed by a fixation cross, presented for a 
duration randomized between 3250 and 5250 milliseconds. Data were collected in one 
run and participants could take a short break in the scanner after the first 144 trials. 
Theory of mind task
We used an adapted version of the theory of mind (ToM) task that is commonly used to 
identify brain areas specific for mentalizing (Dodell-Feder et al., 2011; Saxe & Kanwisher, 
2003). In this task, participants read a total of twenty short stories, describing either a 
false belief or a false photograph. Following the procedures used by Dodell-Feder and 
colleagues, each story was presented for 10 seconds and followed by a question about 
the story. Participants were given 4 seconds to answer the question before the trial 
ended. The order of the stories was randomized for each participant. After each question, 
a fixation cross was shown for 12 seconds (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Schematic representation of the procedure in the ToM task, with examples from the 
original version of the task in English. Each trial started with a short story that was followed by a 
statement. Participants indicated whether the statement was true or false. Each trial ended with 
a fixation cross.   
fMRI data acquisition
Functional images were acquired using a 3-Tesla MRI scanner (Siemens Magnetom Skyra, 
Erlangen, Germany) with a 32-channel head coil. A multi-echo EPI sequence sensitive to 
the blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal contrast was used (34 transversal slices 
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with a voxel resolution of 3.5 × 3.5 × 3.0 mm, acquired in ascending order, interleaved 
scanning, TR = 2.07 s, TE = 9 ms, 19.25 ms, 29.5 ms, and 39.75 ms, distance factor = 17%, 
90° flip angle, 224 mm FOV). The first 30 volumes were used for calculation of the echo-
weighting parameters and were discarded in data analysis. During the break between 
the bowling task and the ToM task, high-resolution anatomical images (voxel size 1 × 1 × 
1 mm) were acquired using a T1-weighted MP-RAGE sequence (TR = 2.3 s, TE = 3.03 ms, 
flip angle 8°, 256 mm FOV).
Preprocessing
Data for both the bowling task and the theory of mind task were preprocessed and 
analysed using SPM8 software (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm; Wellcome Trust Centre 
for Neuroimaging, London, UK) running on Matlab 2012b. First, before combining the 
four echoes, all the first echo volumes were realigned to the first volume of the first echo 
and the volumes of the remaining echoes were realigned to the first echo and resliced. To 
combine the echoes within each volume, the echo-weighting parameters derived from 
the first 30 volumes were applied to the echoes of all remaining volumes. In this process, 
a mean functional image and head movement parameters were created as well. Next, 
functional images were temporally aligned to the middle slice of each volume. The mean 
functional image was co-registered to the anatomical image and the anatomical image 
was segmented into white matter, grey matter and cerebrospinal fluid. The resulting 
normalization parameters were used to normalize the anatomical and functional images 
to the standard template in Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space. Finally, the 
functional images were spatially smoothed using a Gaussian kernel of full-width 8 mm 
at half maximum.
fMRI analyses
Preprocessed fMRI data were analysed using a General Linear Model (GLM) as implemented 
in SPM8. For each participant, we analysed BOLD data as a function of condition. For 
the bowling task, we distinguished four conditions: 2 levels of expectancy (expected vs. 
unexpected outcome) × 2 questions (agent vs. outcome question). In all four conditions, 
the onset was set to the end of the bowling animation, when the question appeared on the 
screen. We included six rigid-body motion parameters obtained during preprocessing, 
errors and onsets of button presses in the model as regressors of no interest. Data were 
convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF) as well as the first 
time derivative, of which only the canonical hemodynamic response was used for further 
analysis. Contrasts for each of the four conditions, derived from these participant-
specific first-level analyses, were introduced to a second-level random-effects analysis, 
in order to allow for population inferences. This was a full-factorial whole-brain analysis, 
in which the main effect of expectancy was analysed by subtracting brain activity in the 
expected trials from that in the unexpected trials. In this analysis, the trials related to the 
two questions were combined and not analysed separately.  
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For the ToM task, we distinguished two conditions: false belief and false photograph. 
The onset was set to the moment the question appeared on the screen. In the analysis, we 
again included six rigid-body motion parameters as regressors of no interest. Data were 
convolved with a canonical HRF and first-level contrasts (false belief > false photograph) 
were derived. These contrasts were introduced to a second-level analysis, in which a 
t-test was used in order to analyse the additional brain activity related to processing 
false beliefs as compared to false photographs. In a follow-up analysis, we created a 
mask of the false belief > false photograph contrast from the ToM task. Using inclusive 
masking, we then analysed whether areas within this mask showed up in the unexpected 
> expected contrast of the bowling task.
For all analyses, we used a cluster-level familywise error (FWE) rate of 0.05, with 
clusters of activation defined with a voxel-level p-value of 0.001 (uncorrected).
Behavioural analyses 
For the bowling task, reaction times to the questions that followed movies in which the 
outcome was 2 or 7 were analysed using a 2 (expected vs. unexpected) × 2 (agent question 
vs. outcome question) repeated measures ANOVA. Reaction times to questions following 
movies with scores 1, 3, 6, and 8 and those to questions that were answered incorrectly 
were excluded from the analysis. The average accuracy was 97.2% over all trials (96.8% 
for the agent question and 97.6% for the outcome question). On average, only 1.3% of 
trials was not answered within the time limit and thus counted as missing. 
For the ToM task, accuracy data suggest that the task was sufficiently difficult. Parti-
cipants scored on average 70.7% correct over all trials. This number was rather similar 
for the false belief (70.9%) and the false photograph (70.4%) statements. Behavioural 
data for this task were not further analysed, as there were no relevant questions related 
to these data.   
RESULTS
Behavioural data bowling task
Based on the assumption that unexpected events result in prediction errors that require 
additional processing, reaction times to questions following unexpected events (i.e. a 
novice player obtaining a high score or an experienced player obtaining a low score) were 
anticipated to be higher than those to questions following expected events (i.e. a novice 
player obtaining a low score or an experienced player obtaining a high score). The results 
of the bowling task show that this is indeed the case: participants needed more time 
to answer questions that followed an unexpected outcome (M = 924.20, SD = 168.16), 
compared to questions that followed an expected outcome (M = 899.62, SD = 165.08), 
F(1, 22) = 5.23, p = .03, ηp
2 = .19. In addition, there was a significant effect of question, 
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F(1, 22) = 25.39, p < .001, ηp
2 = .54, with longer reaction times for the agent question (M 
= 930.09, SD = 149.74) than for the outcome question (M = 861.59, SD = 159.78) but no 
significant interaction effect between question and expectancy, F(1, 22) = 3.56, p = .07, 
ηp
2 = .14 (see Figure 3).  
fMRI data bowling and ToM task
In the fMRI analyses of the bowling task, we tested whether the observation of unexpected 
action outcomes causes additional activation as compared to expected outcomes, in 
line with the processing of prediction errors. In this whole-brain analysis, data for the 
question about the outcome and the question about the player were combined as the 
questions mostly served to ensure that participants would attend to all aspects of the 
scene and no interaction effect between question and expectancy was found in the 
behavioural analysis. Our main interest was in the unexpected > expected t-contrast, 
which revealed significant activation in the left and right inferior parietal lobule, left and 
right middle frontal gyrus, left middle temporal gyrus, and right superior frontal gyrus 
(see Table 1 and Figure 4). 
Table 1. Activations for the unexpected > expected contrast. All results are cluster-level corrected 
using a FWE-rate of 0.05. MNI coordinates (x, y, z) of local maxima for each cluster are given, 
including the cluster voxel extent (k) and the t-statistic (t) at those coordinates.
Brain region x y z k t
Right Inferior Parietal Lobule 51 -61 46 332 6.13
Left Middle Frontal Gyrus -42 50 -11 321 5.54
Left Inferior Parietal Lobule -45 -64 46 520 5.50
Left Middle Temporal Gyrus -57 -34 -14 188 5.22
Left Middle Frontal Gyrus -42 14 43 189 5.02
Right Middle Frontal Gyrus 48 29 40 130 4.29
Right Superior Frontal Gyrus 12 44 52 117 3.91
Figure 3. Reaction times (mean ± SEM) to questions about the agent or the outcome following scores 
that were expected (white bars) or unexpected (grey bars) given the agent’s skill level. 
PSM 20180528 Proefschrift Lieke Heil BW.indd   56 17-07-18   15:10
PREDICTION ERRORS IN MENTALIZING AREAS 
57
3
Figure 4. BOLD responses following unexpected events as compared to expected events (unexpected 
> expected) in the bowling task. For visualization purposes, only significant clusters are shown.
Figure 5. BOLD responses following false belief as compared to false photograph stories (false 
belief > false photograph) in the ToM task. 
In the analyses of the ToM task, activation arising when participants read a story 
describing a false photograph was subtracted from the activation arising when they read 
a story describing a person holding a false belief. This false belief > false photograph 
contrast showed significant activation in the left superior temporal gyrus, left and right 
middle temporal gyrus, cingulate gyrus, right inferior parietal lobule, left and right medial 
frontal gyrus, and right inferior frontal gyrus (see Figure 5 and Table 2). 
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Table 2. Activations for the false belief > false photograph contrast. All results are cluster-level 
corrected using a FWE-rate of 0.05. MNI coordinates (x, y, z) of local maxima for each cluster are 
given, including the cluster voxel extent (k) and the t-statistic (t) at those coordinates.  
Brain region x y z k t
Left Superior Temporal Gyrus -48 -61 25 202 8.83
Left Middle Temporal Gyrus -51 -22 -8 33 8.19
Cingulate Gyrus 0 -58 28 276 8.17
Right Inferior Parietal Lobule 51 -49 22 162 8.10
Left Middle Temporal Gyrus -45 8 -29 16 7.73
Left Medial Frontal Gyrus -3 50 31 45 7.68
Right Middle Temporal Gyrus 48 5 -29 23 7.24
Left Medial Frontal Gyrus -3 56 -5 22 7.23
Right Inferior Frontal Gyrus 51 26 13 2 7.09
Right Medial Frontal Gyrus 15 47 4 1 6.53
Right Middle Temporal Gyrus 60 -7 -17 3 6.31
Furthermore, we analysed whether additional activation related to unexpected events 
in the bowling task partly overlaps with activation in brain areas typically associated 
with social-cognitive processes, using the inclusive mask based on the functional data 
from the ToM task. This mask, based on the false belief > false photograph contrast, was 
assumed to reflect activity associated with social-cognitive processing. Using inclusive 
masking, we analysed whether there were areas within this mask that were significantly 
more active during the observation of unexpected as compared to expected events in 
the bowling task. As in the previous analysis, we analysed the main effect of expectancy 
by subtracting brain activity in the expected trials from that in the unexpected trials. The 
results (presented in Table 3 and Figure 6) show activation in both the left and the right 
angular gyrus, including the left and right TPJ.
Table 3. Activations for the unexpected > expected contrast, masked with the activation from the 
false belief > false photograph contrast from the ToM task. All results are cluster-level corrected 
using a FWE-rate of 0.05. MNI coordinates (x, y, z) of local maxima for each cluster are given, 
including the cluster voxel extent (k) and the t-statistic (t) at those coordinates.  
Brain region x y z k t
Right Angular Gyrus * 51 -58 34 120 5.56
Left Angular Gyrus ** -42 -58 34 213 4.65
* This cluster includes the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ)
** This cluster includes the left temporoparietal junction (lTPJ)
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DISCUSSION
In this study, we investigated the processing of action outcomes that are expected or 
unexpected given prior knowledge about the person performing the action. There are 
two main findings. First, the results of this experiment show increased neural activity in 
the inferior parietal lobule, middle and superior frontal gyrus, and the middle temporal 
gyrus when participants saw a bowling player obtaining a higher or lower score than 
expected. Second, comparing the activity arising during this bowling task with that 
arising during a theory of mind task, we found that in an area around both the left and 
right angular gyrus, which includes the left and right TPJ, neural activity increased not 
only when participants observed unexpected action outcomes, but also when they 
considered the false beliefs of another person. 
The finding that the TPJ shows increased activity during the processing of unexpected 
action outcomes as well as during the processing of other people’s false beliefs suggests 
that observation of action outcomes that are expected or unexpected given previous 
experiences with the person performing the action involves higher level social-cognitive 
processes. The TPJ has been pinpointed as one of the core areas in the mentalizing 
Figure 6. Overlap in BOLD responses between the unexpected > expected contrast in the bowling 
task and the false belief > false photograph contrast in the ToM task. Only significant clusters are 
shown. Parameter estimates of activity in the left and right angular gyrus are shown in the panels 
on the left.
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network, a network of areas involved in the processing of social information. As this 
area is not only recruited during the bowling task used in this experiment, but also when 
people read stories about the thoughts or behaviour of other people, it seems that online 
observation of agent’s actions and their consequences activates knowledge or processes 
also engaged when mentalizing about imagined scenarios. 
Some have suggested that the TPJ is specifically involved in thinking about another 
person’s thoughts (Saxe & Powell, 2006), although the area has also been found to be 
active during more general attention-related tasks, which has inspired alternative 
theories about its functions. For instance, it has been suggested that there are different 
clusters within the TPJ, one involved in attention, the other in social processing (Krall 
et al., 2015; Mars et al., 2011). It has also been suggested that the area may be primarily 
involved in reorienting attention and that it is also active during tasks requiring social 
cognition, because such tasks involve reorienting of attention and other more domain-
general processes (Corbetta, Patel, & Shulman, 2008; Decety & Lamm, 2007; Mitchell, 
2007; Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). Our findings do not distinguish between these 
different theories and do therefore not imply that the processes involved are necessarily 
uniquely social. 
Importantly, however, the action outcomes are only unexpected based on partici-
pants’ prior experiences with the bowling player: knowing that a player is experienced, 
makes a low score unexpected. The outcomes themselves are equally frequent and our 
results can therefore not be explained by an overall difference in frequency. As we have 
suggested in the study described in chapter 2, it seems that the bowling task in this 
study not only requires associating a colour and a score, but also considering the causal 
relation between the two. Knowing that the player causes the ball to move towards the 
pins and knock them over allows people to predict the score based on which person is 
currently playing. This suggests that the areas activated are involved in more abstract, 
higher-order processes that support predictions about action outcomes based on 
knowledge about a person. 
The finding that observation of action outcomes that are unexpected given previous 
experiences with the person performing the action causes increased neural activity is in 
line with the idea that prediction errors play a key role in cognitive processing. As such, 
it is also in agreement with previous studies showing that the processing of unexpected 
events requires more resources in terms of time (e.g. O’Reilly et al., 2013) and neural 
activation (e.g. Summerfield et al., 2008). A potential interpretation of these findings is 
that there is a common mechanism involving the explaining away of prediction errors 
that underlies not only the processing of observed behaviour that is unexpected given 
prior knowledge about that specific person, but the processing of unexpected events in 
general. The idea of such a general mechanism is a central assumption of the predictive 
processing framework, which has been posed as a unifying framework for brain func-
tioning (Clark, 2013b; Friston, 2005). In this framework, it is assumed that incoming 
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information is compared to predictions and that potential prediction errors arising 
from this comparison are then used to update the generative models underlying these 
predictions. In this sense, cognitive processing is primarily focused on this explaining 
away of prediction errors. Although the idea that this framework can explain perceptual 
inference is gaining acceptance, there is no consensus on whether it can also explain 
more abstract, social processing (e.g. Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013). Our findings are in line 
with this last idea, but they do not distinguish between the predictive processing and 
other frameworks. For instance, based on an account in which probabilistic inference 
takes place after rather than before the observation of the events, one could assume that 
inference of a less probable event requires more processing resources than inference 
of a more probable event, resulting in increased activity in trials that we labelled as 
‘unexpected’. Based on such an account we would indeed predict similar results, but 
whereas the predictive processing framework assumes that this additional processing is 
required in order to explain away prediction error, it is unclear which mechanism requires 
additional processing in case of such non-predictive type of probabilistic inference. 
Since the posterior probability of the causes is conditioned on the observed event it is 
computationally no longer relevant whether the event was likely or unlikely. 
Furthermore, it seems that the predictive processing framework could actually be 
seen as complementary to several other accounts of human cognition. Especially asso-
ciative theories are sometimes suggested to compete with the predictive processing 
framework, but they might not necessarily oppose it. As Press, Heyes, and Kilner (2011) 
suggest, for example, the associative sequence learning model and the predictive 
processing framework seem to address related but different questions. Associative 
sequence learning, on the one hand, explains how relations are learned whereas predictive 
processing, on the other hand, explains how learned relations support inferences about 
other people’s actions and their outcomes. Moreover, associative sequence learning 
assumes that events are associated when their occurrence follows the principles of the 
Rescorla-Wagner model (Cooper et al., 2013). According to this model, learning does 
not take place because two events simply co-occur, but because this co-occurrence is 
unexpected and thus results in a prediction error (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972).
In sum, the findings of the current study are in line with the idea that prediction 
errors play a key role in the processing of action outcomes that are unexpected given 
prior knowledge about a person and that part of these prediction errors is explained 
away in brain areas typically associated with social-cognitive processes. Future research 
will need to determine whether social-cognitive processes are indeed built upon general 
predictive principles that have been previously attributed to more low-level processing. 
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Biased person performance models: how ingroup 
overestimation persists in the face of outgroup individuation
Based on: Heil, L., Brecht, S., Kwisthout, J., Van Pelt, S., Van Rooij, I., & 
Bekkering, H. (submitted). Biased person performance models: How ingroup 
overestimation persists in the face of outgroup individuation. 
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ABSTRACT
Our judgments of another person’s performance or characteristics may be biased 
depending on whether the person is considered part of one’s own social group (the 
ingroup) or another social group (the outgroup). For instance, people sometimes over-
estimate performance of ingroup members compared to outgroup members and 
distinguish less between individual outgroup than ingroup members. Little is known, 
however, about the models underlying predictions about individual task performance. 
Do these person performance models differ between ingroup and outgroup? And do they 
distinguish between individuals in both ingroup and outgroup? We investigated this using 
a minimal group paradigm in which participants predicted the scores of players from two 
different teams in a bowling game. Participants’ predictions showed clear individuation 
in both outgroup and ingroup (i.e. they distinguished between individual members in 
both groups), but also a reliable overestimation of ingroup performance. This suggests 
that ingroup overestimation occurs even in conditions where reliable information about 
task performance is available and both ingroup and outgroup members are clearly 
individuated. In other words, ingroup overestimation seems to be a robust bias that does 
not disappear when information about a person’s actual performance is provided. This 
would imply that ingroup overestimation is not simply the result of having more detailed 
knowledge about one’s own social group and that gaining more information about 
outgroup members does not necessarily reduce ingroup overestimation. We discuss the 
societal implications of these findings.  
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INTRODUCTION
Whether judging if someone is a good fit for a certain job, if one sports player is better 
than the other, or if someone is a friendly person, we often make judgments about 
another person’s performance or characteristics. Rather than being purely objective, 
these judgments are biased depending on the social group the person belongs to. One 
prominent example of this is that our judgments are, consciously or unconsciously, 
influenced by whether the person is considered part of one’s own social group (the 
ingroup) or another social group (the outgroup). 
For instance, when encountering people that we consider to be members of an 
ingroup, we tend to like them more than others (e.g. Martiny-Huenger, Gollwitzer, & 
Oettingen, 2014; Nesdale, Maass, Griffiths, & Durkin, 2003) and associate them with 
more positive character traits (Doise et al., 1972; Otten & Moskowitz, 2000). This so-
called ‘ingroup bias’ occurs automatically (Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, & Monteith, 2001) and 
is associated with ‘ingroup favouritism’: a tendency to act more prosocially towards 
members of our own social group (Everett, Faber, & Crockett, 2015; Tajfel, 1970; Turner, 
1975). 
When judging other people’s actions, this ingroup bias seems to express itself as 
an overestimation of ingroup performance. One of the few studies reporting on this is 
a classic study by Hastorf and Cantril (1954). In their experiment, students watched a 
football match between two teams and they reported fewer infractions for a certain team 
when this team was their own rather than the rivalling team. In a more recent study by 
Molenberghs and colleagues (2013), participants performed a task in which they moved 
their hands as quickly as possible. Afterwards, when they viewed movies of ingroup and 
outgroup members performing the same task, they judged the movements of ingroup 
members to be faster than those of outgroup members. 
In addition to this overestimation of ingroup characteristics and performance, it 
seems that people distinguish more between ingroup members than between outgroup 
members. The most prominent example of such a difference in individuation is that 
people have been found to be better at recognizing faces of members of their own 
group, even when they are randomly assigned to this group and perceptual expertise 
is the same for both groups (Bernstein et al., 2007; Van Bavel, Swencionis, O’Connor, & 
Cunningham, 2012). Possibly, this is the result of increased attention for information 
related to ourselves and our social group, which would be in line with the finding that 
people are faster in judging information related to themselves (Sui, He, & Humphreys, 
2012) and with neuroimaging studies showing increased neural responses to members of 
an ingroup and an outgroup. For instance, viewing faces of members of an ingroup was 
found to be associated with a larger amplitude of the face-sensitive N170 ERP component 
(Golby et al., 2001) and more activation in the fusiform gyrus and other brain areas 
(Ratner & Amodio, 2013; Van Bavel et al., 2008). Furthermore, Molenberghs et al. (2013) 
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found increased activity in the left inferior parietal lobule when people observed hand 
actions of their own team as compared to those of the other team. 
It is conceivable that increased individuation and overestimation of ingroup members 
as compared to outgroup members also influences the way people form expectations 
about the future performance of others. In order to form such expectations, people need 
to build cognitive models based on prior experiences. Some researchers suggest that 
such generative models not only allow us to make predictions, but that they also guide 
perception (Clark, 2013b; Friston, 2005). According to this predictive processing view, not 
only basic visual perception, but also social perception is best described as a process 
of top-down hypothesis testing (e.g. Bach & Schenke, 2017; Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013; 
Otten et al., 2017). Although person performance models are indeed likely to be used 
as generative models that drive perception, in this study we are interested in the way in 
which these models allow us to predict the performance of people around us.
Little is known, for instance, about the way in which the models that we use to 
predict the performance of ingroup members differ from those we use to predict the 
performance of outgroup members. Given the evidence on ingroup overestimation 
and individuation, there are two possibilities, which are not mutually exclusive. First, 
one might expect the person performance models for groups to differ in the sense that 
members of our own group are represented more positively than members of the other 
group, resulting in a general overestimation of their characteristics and performance. 
In other words, the models may reflect ingroup overestimation. Second, the person 
performance models may differ in the sense that the model for the ingroup is based on 
information about individual task performance, whereas the model for the outgroup is 
based on information about task performance on a group level. In this case, the person 
performance models would reflect a difference in individuation between ingroup and 
outgroup. 
It is not unlikely that people’s generative models are both more positive and more 
individuated for ingroup members. As far as we are aware, however, previous studies 
have neither specifically investigated the cognitive models that drive predictions about 
other people’s performance, nor have they investigated overestimation and individuation 
at the same time in one experiment. For instance, many studies showing increased 
individuation of ingroup members focus on face recognition rather than judgment of 
other people’s task performance. As such, they do not test any kind of overestimation 
of task performance. In contrast, studies showing ingroup overestimation do not pro-
vide participants with reliable information about individual group members’ task 
performance. In the study by Molenberghs et al. (2013), for example, participants only 
saw a hand and could not identify individual group members. Hence, such studies do not 
test individuation. 
In this study, we aimed to investigate the models underlying predictions when reliable 
information about individual task performance is available. We used a minimal group 
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design in which participants were randomly assigned to one of two teams. They viewed 
animated movies of people playing a bowling game and were instructed to predict the 
score in each movie. These predictions could be based on the average score of a specific 
player. In total, there were ten players, divided over two teams. We hypothesized that the 
predictions of participants would indicate that they distinguish more between members 
of the ingroup and generally overestimate their performance. 
In the following section, we disclose all measures, manipulations, and exclusions, as 
well as the method for determining the final sample size. 
METHODS
Participants
Thirty healthy participants (mean age: 21.30 ± 2.27, all women) with normal to corrected-
to-normal vision participated in the study. The sample size of 30 participants was 
determined before data analysis and we continued to test until we reached this goal. No 
participants were excluded from the analyses. We only invited women to participate, as 
we hoped this would aid identification with the female players in the stimulus movies. 
The participants received course credits or 10 euro for participation. The study was 
approved by the institution’s local ethics committee and written informed consent was 
obtained from each participant. 
Stimuli
Using Autodesk’s 3ds Max 2014 and MotionBuilder 2014 (www.autodesk.com), animated 
movies with a duration of 4500 ms were created. These movies showed a bowling 
player throwing a ball directed at ten pins standing at the end of the bowling lane. Two 
different avatars were used for the bowling players: one with a blue shirt and one with 
a red shirt. Both were taken from Worldviz Vizard Complete Characters (www.worldviz.
com/products/avatars/complete-characters) and were selected based on their female 
appearance. Half of the movies showed the ball rolling slightly towards the left side of the 
lane and the other half showed the ball rolling slightly towards the right side of the lane. 
In all movies, the ball knocked over at least one pin. This resulted in 36 movies, differing 
in terms of the colour of the player’s shirt (blue or red), score (1 to 9) and trajectory of the 
ball (left or right). 
The movies were used to represent the actions of ten bowling players. These players 
could be identified by pictures selected from the Radboud Faces Database (Langner et 
al., 2010). All pictures showed a young female face with a neutral facial expression. Two 
independent ratings of attractiveness were used to ensure similarity of the faces. 
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Procedure and design
When participants entered the lab, the experimenter informed them that they were 
assigned to either the red team or the blue team. They were instructed to wear a shirt and 
a wristband in the team’s colour. In addition, a logo in the same colour was placed next to 
the screen. The coloured cues were used to create a more realistic setting that enabled 
identification with the own team and to remind participants of their team affiliation 
during the entire task.  
After the group manipulation, participants were told that they would be watching 
movies that were based on actual performance of players of their team and the other 
team in a bowling competition and that they would be asked to predict their scores. 
They received no further explanation of why they needed to report these predictions. 
Furthermore, participants were instructed to observe each action carefully, as they 
would be asked which team won at the end of the task. In order to make the task more 
realistic and to facilitate group affiliation, they were also told that they would receive a 
reward in case their own team would win. 
The task was presented using Presentation software (version 17.1, www.neurobs.
com). It started with the calibration of an eye tracker, which was used to track participant’s 
eye movements. We intended to measure the amount of time spent looking at the player, 
in order to analyse whether this would correlate with the amount of individuation within 
each team. For technical reasons, however, we were only able to collect eye tracking data 
for 22 out of 30 participants and we therefore decided not to include these data in our 
analyses. 
After calibration, participants performed four practice trials, which were indepen-
dent of the main task and served to familiarize participants with the task. During 
these practice trials, participants received feedback on their performance and case of 
insufficient performance on these trials, instructions were repeated. 
In the main experiment, both teams consisted of five players, each with a different 
average score (or skill level) ranging from three to seven (Figure 1A). Before each movie, 
a picture of the current player was shown (Figure 1B). This picture was presented in a 
blue or red frame, indicating to which team the player belonged. Participants were asked 
to indicate which score they expected this player to get by pressing the corresponding 
number on a keyboard. The screen showing the picture and the question was shown for 
2500 ms or until the question was answered.
After that, the movie was presented, showing the player receiving her average score 
or a score close to that. In total, there were 340 trials, presented in random order and 
equally distributed over the ten players. Of the 34 trials in total for each player, she 
received her average score in fourteen trials, a score of one point above or below average 
in sixteen trials, and a score of two points above or below average in four trials. In 23 of 
all 340 trials, the movie was followed by a question about which score participants just 
saw, to ensure that participants would attend to the actual outcome. After each trial, a 
fixation cross was presented for 700 ms.
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The bowling task was followed by four questions that served to check if participants 
indeed aff iliated more with their own than with the other team and if they assumed 
that their team was better than the other. Aft er these questions, participants performed 
an implicit test of team aff iliation. This task was an adjusted version of the implicit 
association test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) and was intended to test 
participants’ associations between the teams and their members on the one hand 
and words related to self and other on the other hand. There were 260 trials, divided 
over fi ve blocks of which three were merely practice blocks. In each block, participants 
categorized pictures of bowling players from the bowling task they performed previously 
and/or words related to ‘self’ and ‘other’, based on the words used in a previous study 
(Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). They were instructed to perform this categorization by 
pressing buttons on the left  and right as quickly as possible, as the pictures and words 
disappeared aft er 2000 ms. The categories were ‘blue team’ versus ‘red team’ and ‘self’ 
versus ‘other’. In the two main blocks, one button was used for two diff erent categories. 
For example, in the congruent block, the same button was used to categorize pictures 
of members from the own team and self-related words. In the incongruent block, the 
Figure 1. Example of players and their average scores for one of the teams (A) and a schematic 
overview the main events in the bowling experiment (B).
A
B
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same button was used to categorize pictures of members of the own team and other-
related words. The slowing in reaction time in the incongruent block was then assumed 
to reflect the interference caused by the associations between the own team and self-
related words and between the other team and other-related words. In other words, we 
assumed that the more participants affiliated with their team, the more they slowed 
down when they had to link their team to the concept of ‘other’. As the IAT has been found 
to be insensitive to voluntary control (Kim, 2003), the results should reflect actual team 
affiliation, which is not influenced by, for example, demand characteristics. 
At the end of the experiment, participants filled out a questionnaire to assess their 
competitive attitude (adapted from Ryckman, Hammer, Kaczor, & Gold, 1990). Finally, 
participants were told that their own team had won the bowling competition and they 
were all given a candy bar as a reward before leaving the lab.  
RESULTS
Team affiliation
Before being able to interpret the results from the bowling task, it is important to analyse 
if participants indeed affiliated with their own team. They answered questions about 
how strongly they felt part of the red team and the blue team on a twenty-point visual 
analogue scale ranging from -10 to 10. As expected, a paired-samples t-test comparing 
the answers to these questions shows that participants felt part of their own team 
(M = 4.67, SD = 2.51), more than the other team (M = 2.80, SD = 1.63), t(29) = 3.39, p = .002. 
This is in agreement with findings from the IAT, which provides a more implicit 
measure of team affiliation. For the analysis of this task, trials with very short reaction 
times (< 100 ms) and trials in which no answer was given within the time limit of 2000 
ms were excluded. Reaction times for incongruent blocks (M = 803.81, SD = 120.72), were 
significantly higher than for congruent blocks (M = 726.83, SD = 104.08), t(29) = 4.55, 
p < .001. This finding suggests that participants associated themselves more strongly 
with members of their own team than with members of the other team and that this 
association slowed down their responses when the task required them to follow 
instructions that were incongruent with this association. 
In the first block of the IAT, participants matched pictures of the players to the 
teams. Although they only had 2000 ms for each picture, participants managed to do this 
correctly in on average 96.7% (and minimally 85%) of all trials. This suggests that they 
learned to associate the players with the correct teams.  
PSM 20180528 Proefschrift Lieke Heil BW.indd   70 17-07-18   15:10
PERSON PERFORMANCE MODELS OF INGROUP AND OUTGROUP MEMBERS 
71
4
Bowling task
The predicted scores in the bowling task were analysed using a 2 (teams: own vs. other) 
× 5 (skill level: 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7) repeated measures ANOVA. A sensitivity power analysis 
conducted in GPower (version 3.1; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) showed 
that this analysis, with the current sample size and significance criterion, should have 
sufficient power (β = .80) to detect small to medium effect sizes (f = .16). Trials in which the 
participants answered after the question disappeared from the screen were excluded. 
This was the case for on average 3.2 trials for each participant and less than or equal to 
10 out of all 340 trials for all participants. 
Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated for the main 
effect of skill level, χ2(9) = 33.12, p <.001, and we therefore report the Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrected degrees of freedom for this effect, but not for the other effects. The results 
show no interaction between team and skill level, F(4, 116) = .60, p = .67, ηp
2 = .02. They 
do, however, show that the predicted score depends significantly on both the team of 
the player, F(1, 29) = 9.64, p = .004, ηp
2 = .25 and her average skill level, F(2.60, 75.45) = 
20.96, p < .001, ηp
2 = .42 (see Figure 2). More specifically, participants overestimated the 
performance of members of their own team: they predicted the scores of their team to 
be higher (M = 5.56, SE = .11) than those of the other team (M = 5.11, SE = .94), an effect 
that did not correlate with individual participants’ competitive attitude. In addition, they 
seem to have taken the average score of each player into account, as the tests of within-
subjects contrasts showed a significant linear trend, F(1, 29) = 45.28, p < .001, ηp
2 = .61. The 
higher the player’s skill level, the higher the predicted score. The same effect was found 
in separate analyses for ingroup, F(1, 29) = 38.95, p < .001, ηp
2 = .57 and outgroup, F(1, 29) 
= 30.55, p < .001, ηp
2 = .51, suggesting that participants individuate players in both teams. 
This is in line with the fact that there is no interaction between team and skill level, which 
suggests that there is no difference in individuation between ingroup and outgroup. 
Figure 2. Predicted scores for players (mean ± SEM) with different skill levels from the own and the 
other team.
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DISCUSSION
In the current study, we investigated the models underlying predictions about individual 
task performance, using a paradigm in which participants predicted the scores of bowling 
players from their own and another team. There are two main findings. First, our results 
show that participants distinguished between outgroup members in the same way they 
distinguished between ingroup members. This means that in a specific setting such as the 
one created here, people’s person performance models of both ingroup and outgroup are 
based on the performance of individual players, allowing them to individuate members 
of both social groups. Second, participants overestimated the average performance of 
members of their own team, suggesting that the person performance model for each 
member of our own social group incorporate a positive bias, while members of the other 
social group are represented more veridically. 
Of course, participants were not able to predict the performance of the players 
perfectly. As the slopes in Figure 2 show, the predictions for all players reflect regression 
to the mean, probably caused by the fact that when participants were unsure of their 
answers, they predicted a more average score of around 5. However, on average, estimates 
for the outgroup were more accurate than those for the ingroup, as the performance of 
ingroup members was overestimated.  
Interestingly, these findings suggest that the bias causing ingroup overestimation 
is a robust one that persists even when one individuates members of all groups and 
when one has reliable online information about people’s performance. In our con-
trolled experimental setting participants were provided with clear information about 
performance and they could infer the accuracy of their predictions. Moreover, as we used 
a minimal group design, we did not group our participants according to existing social 
groups, but according to a random assignment to a group. It is interesting to see that 
even in this case, the difference in predictions about ingroup and outgroup members 
remains. It seems that the bias causing ingroup overestimation is a robust one that 
does not disappear when information about a person’s actual performance is provided. 
This effect is unlikely to be caused by demand characteristics, as participants were 
simply instructed to predict the performance of different players and had no reason to 
overestimate members of their own team. Even if they would infer the aim of the study, 
they would be likely to not only overestimate their own team, but also underestimate 
the other team, which does not seem to be the case. Similarly, the findings unlikely to 
be caused by a simple increase in attention for the processing of ingroup information, as 
this should also increase the accuracy and amount of individuation of predictions about 
ingroup members, which is not the case. In this experiment, there is no indication that 
people’s person performance model for the ingroup is more accurate or detailed than 
that for the outgroup. Moreover, the bias in the person performance model seems to be 
driven purely by the social group the observed person belongs to. 
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The observed individuation in both groups is in contrast with previous studies showing 
that we are better at recognizing faces of ingroup members (Bernstein et al., 2007; Van 
Bavel et al., 2012) and studies showing increased neural responses to actions of ingroup 
members (Molenberghs et al., 2013). As hardly any studies have directly investigated the 
person performance models underlying predictions when reliable information about 
individual task performance is available, it is difficult to compare circumstances in which 
individuation does and does not appear. One key difference between studies, however, 
might be the relative importance of ingroup and outgroup members. This importance 
may be driven by the social context. For instance, in certain competitive settings it 
is more important to gather information on the appearance or behaviour of outgroup 
members, potentially resulting in more individuation of the outgroup. This is in line with a 
study by Judd and Park (1988), who showed that under anticipated cooperation, memory 
for ingroup members was better than for outgroup members, but that anticipated 
competition increased memory for individual outgroup members to the level that there 
was no longer a difference between memory for ingroup and outgroup. In the current 
study, we also created a competitive setting, which may have caused participants to 
individuate in both groups. This would explain the contrast with the studies on face 
recognition, as those studies used more neutral settings in which the outgroup may have 
been perceived as less relevant (Bernstein et al., 2007; Van Bavel et al., 2012). 
Another difference with previous studies may be the difficulty of the task or, in other 
words, the amount of information to be stored in the cognitive model. In this study, 
participants were presented with ten players for which information needed to be stored, 
which was less than the 40 faces that were shown in the studies by Bernstein et al. (2007) 
and Van Bavel et al. (2012). Therefore, it may have been rather easy for our participants to 
distinguish between individuals in both their own and the other team. 
This potential role of the amount of information that needs to be represented may also 
explain the difference between this study and a study by Rubinstein, Jussim, and Stevens 
(2018). In that study, it was found that when people receive individuating information 
about two individuals from different racial groups, they are able to overcome the stereo-
type bias in their judgements of intelligence. Due to the experimental setting, the 
stereotype bias investigated in that study could be interpreted as similar to the ingroup 
bias we investigated here. Possibly, as participants only processed information about 
two individuals, they may have been able to judge their characteristics more accurately 
than when they would have when judging information about ten different individuals. 
Importantly, our participants seem to have represented information about ingroup 
and outgroup members at similar levels of detail but still overestimated performance 
of the ingroup, which suggests that ingroup overestimation is not simply the result of 
having more detailed knowledge about a certain social group. This also implies that 
gaining more information about outgroup members does not necessarily reduce ingroup 
overestimation. 
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We think that our findings have potential relevance in the light of societal issues. Most 
importantly, they suggest that even if we believe that our predictions of another person’s 
performance are based on objective information about their previous performance, they 
seem to be influenced by the fact that the person we are judging is part of one or another 
social group. If this happens in a controlled setting as the one we created here, the effect 
may be even stronger in more realistic settings, where less information about actual 
performance is available. Imagine, for example, a job interview in which the applicant 
has a different cultural background than the interviewers. If this person is indeed regar-
ded as a member of an outgroup, then his or her skills may be judged less positively 
than those of another applicant who has exactly the same skills, but is regarded as a 
member of the ingroup. If so, then this may explain why employers tend to hire people 
that are culturally similar to them (e.g. Rivera, 2012) and why online resumes of people 
with a name associated with an ethnic minority group are viewed less often than those of 
people with a name associated with an ethnic majority group (Blommaert, Coenders, & 
Van Tubergen, 2013). Our findings suggest that such effects may persist even if employers 
carefully consider information about people from both ingroup and outgroup and thus 
individuate in both groups. This may be one of the reasons why it turns out to be so 
difficult for companies to diversify their workforce. If we indeed overestimate the future 
performance of people that are part of our own social group, we will give them more 
chances and are more likely to offer them a position. Similar problems may occur in other 
settings in which people are selected from a large number of applicants. 
It seems of great societal relevance to further investigate if the ingroup overestimation 
that we have observed when reliable performance data for both ingroup and outgroup is 
provided also occurs in societally relevant scenarios, and if so, how people can be made 
to evaluate the performance of ingroup and outgroup members comparably. In any 
event, our research shows that stimulating outgroup individuation may be insufficient to 
overcome this bias when it occurs. 
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Predictions in action observation: 
the role of causal interpretation
PSM 20180528 Proefschrift Lieke Heil BW.indd   77 17-07-18   15:10
CHAPTER  5
78
ABSTRACT
Prior knowledge about the skill level of a person allows us to form expectations about 
the outcomes of this person’s actions. In the study described in chapter 2, we found 
that this facilitates the processing of expected outcomes and suggested that this was 
driven by knowledge about the causal relation between the agent and the outcome. It 
is unknown, however, whether expectations are only based on causal knowledge about 
agents and their action outcomes (i.e. cause) or whether they can also be based on 
causal knowledge about something that enables the agent to cause a certain outcome 
(i.e. enabling condition). In order to increase our understanding of the role different 
types of causal knowledge in expectations of action outcomes, we here explore the 
latter situation. Participants viewed animated movies of people playing a bowling game 
in which the score was associated with different types of cues. In the first experiment, 
the colour of the bowling lane predicted either a high or a low score. The colour could 
be interpreted as an indication of the type of lane and thus, possibly, also of its quality, 
which is an enabling condition in the causal chain between the player’s actions and the 
score. Participants were faster to answer questions in case these questions followed 
movies in which the score was as could be expected based on the colour of the lane. 
In two follow-up experiments, such an expectancy effect also occurred in situations in 
which the cue was not an enabling cause. Together, these findings suggest that cognitive 
models that aid processing are not only able to represent relations in which the cue is 
related to the causing agent itself but also to an enabling condition and, surprisingly, 
even to a seemingly causally unrelated part of the scene. We discuss these findings in the 
light of cognitive models representing causal or non-causal relations between cues and 
events. 
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INTRODUCTION
In many cases, what we have learned or experienced before may help us understand, 
predict and, if necessary, quickly respond to new events. Imagine, for instance, seeing 
different people trying to open a door: the first time you see someone trying but failing, 
you might be surprised that the door does not open. However, when a second person 
comes by and also tries to open it, you will probably have realized that the door is 
locked and not be as surprised anymore if this person also fails at opening it. Thus, prior 
knowledge, such as the knowledge about a door being locked and the causal relations 
between events, allows us to build up expectations of the outcomes of other people’s 
actions.
It has been suggested that such expectations may actually facilitate the processing 
of events, when events are as expected. For instance, a variety of expected events have 
been found to be associated with decreased reaction times (e.g. O’Reilly et al., 2013; Van 
Elk et al., 2009) and brain activity (e.g. Summerfield et al., 2008; Vander Wyk et al., 2009) 
as compared to unexpected events. 
Expectations arise in cognitive (or generative) models representing prior knowledge. 
As knowledge about causal relations is often a useful source of information on what to 
expect, it seems likely that such knowledge plays a key role in observers’ cognitive models. 
This is in line with the idea that the degree to which two events are associated can partly 
be guided by knowledge about causal relations, as we have suggested previously (Heil 
et al., 2014). This suggestion was based on several findings. For instance, it was found 
that people can only be conditioned to blink their eyes after hearing a tone if they have 
previously learned that there is a relation between this tone and a puff of air to the eye 
(Clark & Squire, 1998). In addition, it was found that the blocking effect in conditioning 
(i.e. the effect that the association of an event A with event Y is prevented if A is presented 
together with another event B that has previously been associated with event Y) depends 
on by whether participants believe that A and B are either possible causes or possible 
effects of Y (Waldmann, 2000). Together, these findings suggest that if observers are 
aware of a causal relation between events, they are more likely to associate them and 
thus expect a second event to occur based on observation of the first event. 
In the study described in chapter 2, we investigated the processing of action 
outcomes that could be predicted based on colour cues. These colour cues could either 
be interpreted as part of or unrelated to the causal chain of events. In the first of three 
experiments, participants watched animated movies of people playing a bowling game 
and reported either which player they saw or which score he obtained. The score could 
be predicted based on knowledge about the skill level of the player, as he was labelled 
as ‘novice’ or ‘experienced’ and usually scored in accordance with this level of expertise. 
Participants were faster to report which player they saw if the outcome (i.e. a high or a low 
score) was expected as compared to when it was not expected. In one of the follow-up 
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experiments, participants watched similar movies, but now the score could be predicted 
based on a colour patch next to the player with the same predictive value as the skill level 
of the player in the first experiment. This time no effect of expectancy was found. Based on 
these findings, we suggested that in a naturalistic situation such as the one created in the 
experiment, expected events are processed more efficiently in case the relation between 
the cue (in this experiment the agent or the colour patch) and the subsequent event (the 
pins falling down) can be interpreted causally. This would mean that the expectancy 
effect in the first experiment was guided by the causal interpretation of the situation: 
knowing that players cause bowling pins to fall down may allow for predictions of the 
score based on knowledge about the players, whereas the lack of a causal interpretation 
may have prevented the formation of predictions in the second experiment. 
In causal relations, there usually is a (human or non-human) agent causing a certain 
event to occur. However, it might depend on other factors whether an agent is actually 
able to cause the event. In the example described earlier, whether the door opens does 
not only depend on whether someone tries to open it, but also on whether it is locked 
or not. If we distinguish between causes and enabling conditions (as suggested by e.g. 
Cheng & Novick, 1991; Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 2001), a person’s movements aimed 
at opening the door can be seen as the cause of the door opening and the door being 
unlocked as the enabling condition. In our previous study, the cue either served to 
identify the cause (i.e. the bowling player) or an object that was not part of the causal 
relation (i.e. the colour patch).
It is unknown, however, whether the expectations that are built up based on prior 
experiences and existing knowledge take cues about enabling conditions into account. 
For instance, independent of the specific movements of a bowling player, a certain type 
of bowling lane might cause a smoother movement of the ball and therefore a higher 
score. A cue indicating the type of bowling lane could therefore be used to build up an 
expectation of the score. Such an expectation might aid efficient processing and thus 
cause a shortening of reaction times. 
Therefore, in this study, we aimed to investigate whether an expectancy effect 
indeed occurs in case expectations can be based on an enabling condition rather than 
on the cause itself. In the first experiment, we manipulated the colour of the bowling 
lane which, as suggested before, could be interpreted as an indication of the type of lane. 
There was a probabilistic relation between the colour and the score in the sense that one 
colour was associated with a low score and one with a high score. Therefore, participants 
might believe one lane is better than the other and as such, the colour may help them 
build up an expectation of the score based on the lane colour. In other words, they may 
interpret the type of lane as an enabling condition that partly determines whether the 
actions of the player cause a high or a low score. If such a relation is indeed represented 
in the participants’ cognitive models, they are expected to be faster to answer questions 
if these questions are preceded by a score that is expected based on the lane colour. 
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This would suggest that cognitive models that facilitate processing are able to 
represent relations in which the cue is not related to the causing agent itself but also to 
another factor in the causal chain of events. In order to further investigate how robust 
such an effect would be, we follow up on this experiment with experiments in which the 
interpretation of the cue as an enabling condition in the causal chain is less obvious, such 
as when it is not the lane itself but only the side that is coloured or, as in the previous 
study, when a colour patch is shown next to the player.
The results of this study may help us understand how different types of causal 
information might be used to predict the outcomes of other people’s actions and, as 
such, provide insight in the cognitive models underlying our expectations.
EXPERIMENT 1
Methods
Participants
Thirty-two healthy participants (23 female) between the ages of 18 and 33 (mean age 
22.5) took part in this experiment. All participants were paid 10 euros or received course 
credits for their participation. The study was approved by the institution’s local ethics 
committee and written informed consent was obtained from each participant. 
Stimuli and design
For this experiment, 24 animated movies with a duration of 4500 milliseconds were 
created using Autodesk’s 3ds Max 2014 and MotionBuilder 2014 (www.autodesk.com). 
Each movie showed a male bowler throwing a ball directed at ten pins standing upright 
at the end of a bowling lane. The avatar for the player was selected from Worldviz Vizard 
Complete Characters (www.worldviz.com/products/avatars/complete-characters). In 
order to avoid distraction, the player disappeared at 1300 ms after the start of the movie. 
The bowling ball rolled towards the end of the lane, either slightly left or slightly right of 
the centre, and knocked down 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, or 8 pins. The kinematics of both the action 
kinematics and the ball movement only varied with movement direction (i.e. left or right) 
and were not associated with a certain score. 
In contrast, the colour of the bowling lane was associated with a certain score. For 
half of the participants, a blue lane was associated with a high score and a green lane was 
associated with a low score. For the other participants, this association was reversed. In 
75% of all 432 trials, the score was as could be expected based on colour of the lane. More 
specifically, in 162 out of 216 trials showing a bowling lane in one colour, the score was 
low (i.e. 1, 2, or 3), and in 162 out of 216 trials showing a bowling lane in the other colour, 
the score was high (i.e. 6, 7, or 8). In the analysis, all these trials were labelled ‘predicted’ 
and compared to ‘unpredicted’ trials. Over all trials, the most frequent scores were 2 
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and 7, which appeared in 384 out of 432 trials. The other scores (i.e. 1, 3, 6, and 8) were 
included as fillers aimed to make the experiment more realistic by providing variability 
in scores. 
Procedure
Upon arrival, participants were seated in front of a computer on which the experiment 
was presented. Stimuli and instructions were displayed using Presentation software 
(version 18.1, www.neurobs.com). Participants were asked to follow the instructions on 
the screen, which also explicitly informed them that the bowling lane could be either 
green or blue and that this colour was associated with a certain score. Before starting 
the main task, participants performed four practice trials in which they were reminded 
about this association between the colour and the score.
In all trials, participants watched an animated movie of a bowling event and answered 
a question about it afterwards (see Figure 1). This question either concerned the colour of 
the lane (‘Was the bowling lane blue or green?’) or the score (‘Was the score high or low?’). 
Participants were unaware which one of these questions they would be asked after each 
movie, as they appeared in random order. To answer the question, participants could 
choose between two answer options, presented underneath the question on the screen. 
Participants were instructed to answer as quickly as possible by pressing either the left 
or the right button on a button box. The order of the answer options was randomized to 
prevent motor preparation. The question and the answer options stayed on screen for 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the procedure in Experiment 1. In each trial, participants saw 
an animated movie of a person throwing a ball on either a blue or a green bowling lane and obtaining 
either a low or a high score. Each movie was followed by a question about the colour of the lane or 
the score.
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2000 milliseconds or until the question was answered. Participants received feedback on 
the accuracy of their answer for the practice trials, but not for the other trials. Aft er each 
trial, a fi xation cross was presented for 700 milliseconds. 
Reaction time analysis
We anticipated that answering a question that followed an unpredicted score would take 
more time than answering a question that followed a predicted score. Reaction times 
were analysed using a 2 (prediction: predicted vs. unpredicted) × 2 (question: colour vs. 
score) repeated measures ANOVA. In this analysis, only trials in which the score was 2 or 7 
were considered, since the other scores (i.e. 1, 3, 6, or 8) were only included as fi llers and 
appeared very infrequently. Reaction times to questions that were answered incorrectly 
were excluded from the analysis.
Results and discussion
The analysis showed no signifi cant interaction between prediction and question, F(1, 31) 
= 1.29, p = .26, ηp
2 = .04. However, it did show signifi cant main eff ects of both prediction, 
F(1, 31) = 4.85, p = .04, ηp
2 = .14, and question, F(1, 31) = 15.67, p < .01, ηp
2 = .34. On average, 
the reaction time was 9 ms longer for questions following an unpredicted score than for 
questions following a predicted score and 51 ms longer for the colour question than for 
the score question (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. Reaction times (mean ± SEM) for the colour question and the outcome question in 
Experiment 1, with separate bars for predicted (white bars) and unpredicted outcomes (grey bars).
This means that whether or not a score is as predicted based on knowledge about 
the bowling lane determines at which speed a question will be answered. This in line 
with the idea that predictions play a key role in the processing of new events and with the 
idea that such predictions can be based on a relation between the bowling lane and the 
score. The eff ect of question indicates that participants needed more time to answer the 
question about the colour than the question about the outcome, potentially because of 
the specifi c phrasing or characteristics of these questions. Furthermore, the lack of an 
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interaction effect between question and prediction suggests that the expectation effect 
does not differ between the questions.  
In sum, the results suggest that participants used the cue related to the enabling 
condition (i.e. the colour indicating the type of bowling lane) in order to build up 
expectations of the score. This would mean that their cognitive models are not only able 
to represent relations in which the cue is not related to the agent itself, but also relations 
in which it is related to an enabling condition that is part of the causal chain between 
the agent and the outcome. Although it seems that participants have interpreted 
this situation causally, we cannot be sure that the possibility to interpret the relation 
between the colour of the lane and the score causally was indeed crucial. Therefore, we 
set up a follow-up experiment in which there is no obvious causal interpretation. In this 
experiment, the colour of the side of the lane will be manipulated and there will be a 
link between this colour and the score with the same predictive value as in the current 
experiment. In this case, as the bowling ball does not touch the side of the lane, there is 
no obvious causal relation between its colour and the score. We would therefore expect 
no expectancy effect that facilitates processing. 
EXPERIMENT 2
Methods
Participants
Thirty-two healthy participants (22 female) between the ages of 18 and 34 (mean age 22.5) 
took part in this experiment. An additional two participants completed the experiment 
but were excluded from the analysis because their accuracy for one of the questions was 
below 80%. Again, all participants were paid 10 euros or received course credits for their 
participation. The study was approved by the institution’s local ethics committee and 
written informed consent was obtained from each participant. 
Stimuli and design
The design of this experiment was similar to that of the first experiment. The only 
difference was that we now used animated movies in which it was the side rather than the 
central part of the bowling lane that had a certain colour. The associations of the colours 
with a certain score and the trial distributions remained exactly the same. 
Procedure
In this experiment, we followed the almost same procedure as in the first experiment 
(see Figure 3). Only this time, participants were informed that the side of the bowling lane 
could be either green or blue and that this colour was associated with a certain score. 
The phrasing of the colour question was adjusted accordingly (i.e. ‘Was the side of the 
bowling lane blue or green?’). 
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Reaction time analysis
As in Experiment 1, we analysed reaction times using a 2 (prediction: predicted vs. 
unpredicted) × 2 (question: colour vs. score) repeated measures ANOVA, considering only 
trials in which the score was 2 or 7 and the question was answered correctly. 
Results and discussion
As in the previous experiment, the interaction between prediction and question was 
not significant, F(1, 31) = .11, p = .74, ηp
2 < .01, but there was a significant main effect 
of prediction, F(1, 31) = 5.39, p = .03, ηp
2 = .15. The reaction time to questions following 
an unpredicted score was on average 13 ms longer than the reaction time to questions 
following a predicted score. Also, there was a significant main effect of question, F(1, 31) 
= 9.89, p < .01, ηp
2 = .24. The reaction time to the colour question was on average 44 ms 
longer than for the outcome question (see Figure 4).
These findings are similar to those of the previous experiment. It is possible that 
participants have interpreted the relation between the colour of the side of the lane 
and the score as a causal one. Just like the colour of the lane in the first experiment, the 
colour of the side of the lane may have been interpreted as an indication of the type or 
quality of the lane. As such, it may have caused participants to interpret it as a factor 
that influences whether the score will be high or low. Therefore, in another follow-up 
experiment, we manipulated the stimuli in such a way that the cue cannot be interpreted 
as part of the causal chain of events by changing the colour of a patch shown next to the 
player. 
Figure 3. Schematic representation of the procedure in Experiment 2. In each trial, participants saw 
an animated movie of a person throwing a ball on a bowling lane with either blue or green sides and 
obtaining either a low or a high score. Each movie was followed by a question about the colour of 
the lane or the score.
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EXPERIMENT 3
Methods
Participants
Thirty-two healthy participants (23 female) between the ages of 18 and 33 (mean 
age 22.7) took part in this experiment. An additional two participants completed the 
experiment but were excluded from the analysis because their accuracy for one of the 
questions was below 80%. As in the previous experiments, all participants were paid 
10 euros or received course credits for their participation. The study was approved by 
the institution’s local ethics committee and written informed consent was obtained from 
each participant. 
Stimuli and design
The design of this experiment was similar to that of the other two experiments. The 
animated movies used in this experiment diff ered in the sense that they now showed a 
bowling lane in a neutral colour, with a square patch in a certain colour presented next 
to the player. This patch was either blue or green and this colour was associated with the 
score, with exactly the same regularity as the colour of (the side of) the bowling lane in 
the previous experiments.
Procedure
In this experiment, we followed almost the same procedure as in the previous experiments 
(see Figure 5). Participants were informed that the colour patch could be either green or 
blue and that this colour was associated with a certain score. Again, the phrasing of the 
colour question was adjusted accordingly (i.e. ‘Was the patch blue or green?’). 
Figure 4. Reaction times (mean ± SEM) for the colour question and the outcome question in 
Experiment 2, with separate bars for predicted (white bars) and unpredicted outcomes (grey bars).
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Reaction time analysis
As in Experiments 1 and 2, we analysed reaction times using a 2 (prediction: predicted vs. 
unpredicted) × 2 (question: colour vs. score) repeated measures ANOVA, considering only 
trials in which the score was 2 or 7 and the question was answered correctly. 
Results and discussion
The analysis showed no significant interaction between prediction and question, 
F(1, 31) = .03, p = .87, ηp
2 < .01. This is in line with the previous experiments, as are the 
significant main effects of prediction, F(1, 31) = 11.65, p < .01, ηp
2 = .27, and question, 
F(1, 31) = 11.67, p < .01, ηp
2 = .27. The reaction time was on average 22 ms longer for 
questions following an unpredicted score compared to questions following a predicted 
score and 49 ms longer for the colour question than for the score question (see Figure 6). 
Again, these findings are similar to those in the first two experiments. As in those 
experiments, it seems that predictions are built up based on the association between the 
colour and the score and that these predictions speed up processing of expected events. 
We hypothesized that the lack of a causal interpretation in this situation (i.e. there is 
no plausible explanation of why a colour patch would be part of the causal chain and 
thus influence the score) would prevent participants from building a cognitive model in 
which the score can be predicted based on the colour. If this would indeed be the case, 
then we would not expect a difference in reaction times between the predicted and the 
unpredicted events. 
Figure 5. Schematic representation of the procedure in Experiment 3. In each trial, participants saw 
an animated movie of a person throwing a ball on a bowling lane and obtaining either a low or a high 
score. Next to the person, either a blue or a green patch was shown. Each movie was followed by a 
question about the colour of the lane or the score.
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In order to determine if there was a diff erence in the expectancy eff ect between 
the three experiments, we analysed the data from all three experiments in one ANOVA, 
with prediction and question as within-subject factors and experiment as a between-
subject factor. This analysis shows that there is no interaction between prediction and 
experiment, F(1, 93) = 1.42, p = .25, ηp
2 = .03. This means that there is no evidence that the 
expectancy eff ect diff ers between experiments. 
DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to investigate how diff erent types of causal information 
might be used to predict the outcomes of other people’s actions. We assumed that 
causal knowledge plays a key role in building up expectations about action outcomes 
and therefore, that whether or not people expect a certain action outcome based on a 
predictive cue would depend on whether the cue was part of the causal chain between 
the agent and the outcome. Surprisingly, however, expectancy eff ects were found in all 
three experiments, including at least one in which there was no obvious causal relation 
between the cue and the action outcome. This suggests that cognitive models that aid 
processing are not only able to represent relations in which the cue is related to the 
causing agent itself but also relations in which the cue is related to an enabling condition 
or even to a seemingly unrelated part of the scene. 
In the fi rst experiment, we examined whether participants would use knowledge 
about an enabling condition in the causal chain of events, such as the type of bowling 
lane in the fi rst experiment, to build up expectations about the action outcome. This 
indeed seemed to be the case: participants seem to have used the colour cue to predict 
the score. Contrary to our expectations, however, the results of the two follow-up 
Figure 6. Reaction times (mean ± SEM) for the colour question and the outcome question 
in Experiment 3, with separate bars for predicted (white bars) and unpredicted outcomes 
(grey bars).
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experiments suggest that participants also used the colour cue to predict the score when 
a causal interpretation was unlikely. In the second experiment, the colour cue was part 
of the side of the bowling lane. One could argue that in this case, the colour also used as 
a way to identify the type of lane and therefore could still be part of the causal chain of 
events. However, there was no reason why the colour patch in the third experiment could 
be seen as part of this causal chain, as it was not related to the player, to the lane, the ball 
or the pins. 
Interestingly, the expectancy effects we found in all three experiments differ from 
those found in the study described in chapter 2. In that study, as described in the 
introduction, participants first saw different players who obtained different average 
scores. We not only found an expectancy effect in the sense that responses to questions 
following unexpected events were slowed down as compared to those following expected 
events, but we also found that this expectancy effect specifically occurred when parti-
cipants reported which player they saw. When participants reported which score they 
saw, there was no expectancy effect. Our interpretation of this difference between 
questions was that the cognitive model from which predictions arise represents player 
and score in a hierarchical relation. Information about the score is represented at the 
level below that at which information about the player is represented. Our assumptions 
for this model were derived from the predictive processing framework, which suggests 
that the brain is primarily focused on processing the difference between predictions and 
actual sensory input. The predictions are sent from higher cognitive levels down to lower 
levels, whereas prediction errors that result from the comparison are sent back up in 
order to improve the predictions (Clark, 2013b; Friston, 2010). In terms of the previous 
study, in case an event is not as expected, this causes a prediction error at the level of 
score, which is sent to the level above, where the cognitive model needs to be updated 
in order to resolve the prediction error. We then suggested that because this requires 
additional processing at the higher level, reporting of the cause (i.e. the player) is slowed 
down. As a result, an unexpected event might specifically slow down reporting of the 
player as in the agent question, but not influence reporting of the score in a similar 
manner. 
Assuming that this interpretation is correct, one might expect a similar difference 
between questions in the current study. However, in this study, the expectation effects 
show up in both questions: participants are slower to respond to a question that follows 
an unexpected score, independent of whether this question is about the colour or the 
score. Potentially, this could mean that none of the cues is actually interpreted as part of 
the causal chain. The colour of the bowling lane (or its side) may not have been interpreted 
as an indication of the type of lane and thus of its potential to enable a high score. In 
this case, the expectancy effect would have been caused by a non-hierarchical, non-
causal association between a colour and a score. In our previous study, we suggested 
that links between levels in the cognitive model have a causal interpretation, whereas 
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links within one level do not need such causal interpretation. The idea that links between 
levels have a causal interpretation is in line with the view that, according to predictive 
processing, top-down predictions infer sensory data from high-level causes and that, 
therefore, the causal structure of the world is reflected in backward connections (Friston, 
2005). Our current findings might then be an indication that the cognitive model that 
observers use does not represent information related to the cue at a higher level than 
information related to the action outcome. Instead, the different types of information 
might be represented at one level and purely associative links that have a non-causal 
interpretation. 
Such a difference between models with hierarchical, causal links on the one hand 
and non-hierarchical, non-causal links on the other hand might also be able to explain 
another difference between this and our previous study. In real-world situations, it 
seems likely that causal associations are usually more informative: knowledge about the 
mechanism causing a certain event often helps building up correct expectations about the 
occurrence of this event. This may also explain why, when observing the actions of other 
people, we do not simply interpret these actions as associated with a certain outcome, but 
interpret these actions as a means to reach a certain goal (Csibra & Gergely, 2007). Based 
on this idea, it is conceivable that non-causal associations lead to weaker predictions 
than causal ones (Tversky & Kahneman, 1980). Causal associations, on the other hand, 
may be more selective. It has been found, for instance, that if one cue is assumed to 
cause a certain outcome, the other cue is less likely to be interpreted as a cause of the 
same outcome (Pineño, Denniston, Beckers, Matute, & Miller, 2005). Potentially, there is a 
balance between strength and specificity: whereas causal associations are rather specific 
but strong predictors of an outcome, non-causal associations are broader, but weaker 
predictors of this outcome. Assuming that the predictions in two of the experiments of 
the previous study were based on causal associations, while those in the current study are 
based on non-causal associations, this might explain why the expectancy effect is larger 
in the previous study than in the current study. In the two experiments in the previous 
study in which an expectancy effect was found, the average difference in reaction time 
between expected and unexpected trials for the question about the agent or colour was 
around 37 ms. However, in the same question in the current study, the difference was only 
around 17 ms. Such an interpretation would be in line with inferential reasoning accounts 
of human contingency learning, that assume that top-down inferential processes play a 
role in the process of learning that two events are related (see Pineño & Miller, 2007 for an 
overview of different accounts). 
The last experiment in this study is actually very similar to the second experiment 
in the previous study. In both experiments, participants could base their predictions 
about the score on a colour patch next to the bowling player and the probabilistic 
relation between the cue and the score were the same. However, whereas we found no 
expectancy effect in the first study, we did find it in this study. Potentially, this is the result 
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of a lower power in the first study, as that study involved fewer trials and participants. 
Together with the difference in reaction time effects, this might imply that there is no 
qualitative difference, but primarily a quantitative difference between different types of 
associations.  
It would be interesting for future research to further investigate if there are indeed 
be different types of links between representations in cognitive models, which differ in 
terms of their strength or ease of learning. Furthermore, assuming that participants in 
this study did not build a cognitive model in which the cue was causally linked to the 
outcome, we cannot be sure why this is the case. Given the distinction between causes 
and enabling conditions, it is possible that a relation is only encoded as causal when the 
predictive cue is linked to the cause itself rather than to an enabling condition. There are, 
however, also alternative explanations. 
One alternative explanation is that participants were not aware of the causal 
mechanism, as this was not explicitly stated in the instructions. In the first experiment, 
participants were told that the colour of the bowling lane was associated with a certain 
score, but not that one bowling lane was of better quality than the other. Although causal 
interpretation is indeed likely to depend on an understanding of the causal mechanism 
(Shultz et al., 1986), the findings of our previous study suggest that this interpretation can 
also arise without explicit instruction. In the last experiment of that study, we did find an 
expectancy effect even though there were no explicit instructions about the player being 
a ‘novice’ or ‘experienced’ player, but instead there were implicit instructions stating that 
the colour of the player’s shirt was associated with a certain score. 
Another explanation might be that in order for a causal association to be made, 
the cue needs to be related to the agent causing the action. It would be interesting to 
investigate whether this is indeed the case and whether this agent needs to be a person, 
or whether it can also be a non-human (or even inanimate) agent. 
In sum, our findings suggest that people build up expectations about action out-
comes based on a cue that can be used to identify the cause of the action or an enabling 
condition in the causal chain of events. Surprisingly, expectations can also be based on 
a cue that is not part of the causal chain of events. We suggest that this may indicate that 
different types of links between a cue and an outcome differ in terms of the strength of 
predictions arising from an observer’s cognitive model. As such, these findings provide 
insights in the cognitive models underlying our expectations and open up interesting 
questions for future research on this topic. 
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The aim of this thesis was to investigate whether the social-cognitive processing involved 
in understanding and predicting other people’s actions can be explained within the 
predictive processing framework. To that end, four studies were conducted in which 
hypotheses about the potential nature of the generative models underlying predictions 
were formulated and tested. In all studies reported in this thesis, a newly-developed 
bowling paradigm was used. In this paradigm, participants viewed animated movies 
of people playing a bowling game. Based on different types of information, such as 
knowledge about the player, they could build up expectations of the most likely obtained 
score. Chapter 2 described a study in which we investigated whether participants use 
knowledge about the skill level of an individual player in the processing of the player’s 
actions. In the main experiment, participants saw either novice or experienced players 
obtaining a high or a low score and answered questions about the player or the score. 
We assumed that unexpected action outcomes would result in prediction errors, which 
would be reflected in longer reaction times. We found that a predictive processing 
model with a hierarchical structure and causal relations between its levels was able to 
explain the pattern of reaction times in a series of three experiments. In the fMRI study 
reported in chapter 3, participants performed the same task as in chapter 2. We found 
that unexpected action outcomes resulted in additional neural activity that seems to 
reflect explaining away of prediction errors. This activity showed overlap with that in a 
theory-of-mind task, suggesting that part of the prediction errors is explained away in 
brain areas typically associated with social-cognitive processes. Chapter 4 reported on 
a study in which we explored whether the generative models of another person’s task 
performance (i.e. person performance models) differ between ingroup and outgroup. 
Participants saw members of their own and another team playing a bowling game and 
predicted which score each player would obtain. The results suggest that although 
they distinguished between different members of both teams, they still overestimated 
the performance of members of their own social group. Chapter 5 described a study 
focusing on how knowledge about different types of causal factors in the environment 
could be represented in a generative model (in that chapter referred to as cognitive 
model). Participants viewed movies of a person playing a bowling game. In these movies, 
there was a predictive cue that was related to factors that we assumed could (in the first 
experiment) or could not (in the subsequent experiments) be interpreted as enabling 
factors in the causal chain of events. The results suggest, however, that none of the 
situations may have been interpreted causally, but that participants were still able to 
predict the score based on the cues. We speculate that this may be an indication that non-
causal factors may be incorporated in the generative model, be it less easily or with less 
predictive power. In this chapter, the findings will be discussed in terms of the potential 
nature of generative models underlying our predictions of other people’s actions. 
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SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE IN GENERATIVE MODELS
People are usually quick to understand what another person is doing, even if this 
understanding depends on knowledge about the social context or characteristics of the 
person performing the action. Assuming that this can be understood within the predictive 
processing framework, such knowledge needs to be represented in a generative model. 
This generative model can then provide predictions that are tested against input 
received from more low-level areas in the brain. The findings described in this thesis are 
consistent with the idea that people make predictions based on a generative model that 
incorporates information about the person performing the action. Outcomes that are 
unexpected given the skill level of the agent seem to require additional processing as 
compared to expected outcomes, in line with the idea that prediction errors need to be 
explained away. This additional processing is reflected in longer reaction times (chapter 
2) and increased neural activity (chapter 3). 
In addition, our findings suggest that information about the social group a person 
belongs to also influences predictions of action outcomes. In the experiment presented 
in chapter 4, predicted outcomes for ingroup members were overall higher than for 
outgroup members. Ingroup members were expected to score better than outgroup 
members even though knowledge about individual performance was available and 
incorporated in the observers’ generative models, which suggests that information about 
social groups may not simply be used to fill in missing information about individuals. 
Instead, information about individuals and their social groups may both have a separate 
influence on the way in which generative models represent another person’s expected 
performance. This finding is especially relevant to societal issues, as it seems to suggest 
that more knowledge about the performance of individuals from another social group is 
not always enough to overcome ingroup bias.  
HIERARCHICAL GENERATIVE MODELS
An important assumption in the predictive processing framework is that of hierarchical 
generative models: predictions are produced by higher levels in order to inform lower 
levels, whereas the effect of prediction errors propagates upwards. The findings reported 
in chapter 2 are in line with the idea that prediction errors arise at one level, but are 
explained away at a higher level. In the computational model presented in that chapter, 
the higher level represents information about the agent while the lower level represents 
information about the outcome of this agent’s action. Others have suggested other 
divisions between levels that are relevant for action understanding. For instance, Kilner 
(2011) focuses on kinematic, motor, goal and intention levels, while Spunt, Satpute and 
Lieberman (2011) distinguish between the how, what and why of an action, and Hamilton 
and Grafton (2006) describe levels representing movements, actions, immediate goals 
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and task goals. Although the precise distribution of information over levels may depend 
on the task at hand and type of information processed, all seem to agree on the idea 
that levels are ordered according to their abstractness and, related to that, the time they 
require (Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). This is also the case in the model presented 
in chapter 2, where the skill level of the agent exists over a longer period of time and is 
more abstract than the action outcome. 
We assumed that prediction errors arising at the level of the action outcome would be 
explained away at the level of the agent. In line with this assumption, the increased neural 
activity found the study described in chapter 3 was found in several areas including the 
temporoparietal junction, an area typically associated with thinking about other people’s 
thoughts and beliefs (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). Although the paradigm used in this thesis 
does not require considering other people’s mental states, it does require considering 
their personal characteristics (i.e. their skill level). This finding suggests that prediction 
errors do not only arise in areas involved in rather low-level areas, such as those involved 
in visual perception, but also in areas involved in higher, social-cognitive processes, in 
line with the idea that predictive processing provides a unifying framework for brain 
functioning (Clark, 2013b; Friston, 2005, 2010; Hohwy, 2013).  
IMPROVING GENERATIVE MODELS 
The predictive processing framework essentially assumes that processing is facilitated 
by prior experiences and previously acquired knowledge, as represented in generative 
models. In case these generative models are incorrect or incomplete, the predictions 
that they provide will result in prediction errors. Learning occurs when these prediction 
errors are used to improve the generative models. 
This idea that learning is guided by prediction errors is in line with the Rescorla-
Wagner model, a model that was developed to explain in which situations classical 
conditioning occurs (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). It assumes that learning takes place not 
simply because two events co-occur, but because this co-occurrence is unexpected and 
thus results in a prediction error. As such, this type of learning is more advanced than 
simple co-occurrence types of learning, that are often (although possibly incorrectly, see 
Keysers & Gazzola, 2014) considered Hebbian. Learning according to the principles of 
the Rescorla-Wagner model is consistent with the predictive processing framework (Den 
Ouden et al., 2008).  As these principles are central to associative accounts, such as the 
associative sequence learning model (Cooper et al., 2013) and related Hebbian models 
(Keysers & Gazzola, 2014), these accounts can also be incorporated in the framework 
(Campbell & Cunnington, 2017). This would imply that the generative models responsible 
for predictions are, at least in part, developed and improved by the associative learning 
that occurs when prediction errors arise. 
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These processes are likely to occur at all levels of the hierarchy involved in the 
processing of other people’s actions. At the level of processing that occurs in areas 
that are considered part of the mirror neuron system, this integrative view would be in 
line with previous suggestions that mirror neurons acquire their mirroring properties 
by associative learning (e.g. Cook et al., 2014; Heyes, 2010) and that, once they have 
developed these properties, their activity can be explained by predictive principles 
(Csibra, 2008; Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007a; Kilner et al., 2007b; Miall, 2003). 
THE ROLE OF CAUSALITY IN GENERATIVE MODELS
Although associative learning seems to play a key role in the learning from experience, 
this type of learning may not paint the full picture. The findings from the studies described 
in this thesis suggest that learning may not only be guided by associative principles, but 
also by knowledge about the causal structure of the world. In chapter 2, three different 
experiments were described, of which the first two are most relevant to illustrate the role 
of causal knowledge. In the first experiment, participants could base their predictions of 
the outcomes of bowling actions on knowledge about the person performing the action, 
while in the second experiment, these could be based on a simple colour cue. Although 
both cues (i.e. the person in the first experiment and the colour in the second experiment) 
has the same predictive value in terms of contiguity and contingency, only the agent-
related cue seemed to become represented in the participants’ generative models and 
thus used to predict the score. We argued that knowing that agents, but not colours, can 
cause the bowling pins to fall down, created the distinction between the results of the 
two experiments. This is in line with our previous suggestion that higher-level cognitive 
processes, such as causal reasoning, can guide the formation of appropriate associations 
(Heil et al., 2014) and therefore, that the learning mechanism as proposed by associative 
sequence learning or Hebbian accounts may not be sufficient to explain how generative 
models are improved based on experience. This would be in agreement with previous 
studies showing that whether an association is learned or not depends on the causal 
interpretation of the events involved (e.g. Clark & Squire, 1998; Waldmann, 2000). The 
influence of whether or not a situation is perceived as causal or not also explains other 
findings, such as those showing that young children are more likely to predict the 
movement of an object based on the position of a causal agent rather than that of an 
inert object (Saxe et al., 2007) and that the remembered speed of a movement depends 
on the effect it seems to have caused in Michotte’s (1963) launching effect paradigm 
(Kerzel et al., 2000).
This does not mean, however, that it is impossible to build up expectations about 
an event based on a cue that is not causally related to this event. For instance, previous 
studies have shown evidence for prediction errors even in paradigms in which there was 
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no causal relation between the cue and the event (e.g. Den Ouden et al., 2010; Kok et al., 
2012). In addition, in chapter 5 of this thesis, a study was reported in which different types 
of cues were associated with high or low scores in a bowling game. Although it seems that 
participants may not have interpreted these cues as causal (or enabling) factors, they 
were slower to respond to questions after they saw scores that were unlikely given the 
cue. This would mean that they did incorporate the cues in their generative model and 
thus predicted the occurrence of specific outcomes. 
Although more research on the role of causal knowledge in the generative models 
people use to process other people’s actions is required, it seems likely that the extent 
to which associations are formed depends, at least in part, on people’s knowledge of the 
causal structure of the world.  
FUTURE OUTLOOK
In this thesis, I have taken the predictive processing framework as a starting point 
to explore how people process the actions of others. Inspired by the framework, I 
hypothesized that priors represented in generative models would reflect knowledge 
about the person performing the action and the causal structure of the world. Although 
the findings presented and discussed here are consistent with this view and therefore 
show the potential of the predictive processing framework, they do not directly test it. 
Before it will be possible to test the framework and compare it to other accounts, its 
exact characteristics need to be specified further. This not only goes for the predictive 
processing framework, but also for potential alternative frameworks. At this point, 
there do not seem to be any clearly defined alternatives that cannot be explained 
within the predictive processing framework. This need for a more clear definition is 
particularly important for research on abstract social-cognitive processes such as action 
understanding. In the experiments discussed in this thesis, the actions processed are 
relatively straightforward and although participants needed to consider personal 
characteristics of the players, they did not necessarily have to consider their mental 
states. The situation complicates quickly if people need to consider an increasing amount 
and abstractness of information about the people they observe. It is not obvious, for 
instance, how abstract concepts such as intentions are represented in the brain and 
how they give rise to predictions specific enough to be tested against sensory input. It 
is also not clear whether information that is assumed to be processed at one level of the 
hierarchy is necessarily also processed in one area of the brain. It would be interesting 
to investigate how the hierarchies suggested in computational models such as the one 
presented in chapter 2 translate to neural systems. 
Furthermore, future work may help improve our understanding of the role of causality 
in action processing in general and the way in which it can be understood within the 
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predictive processing framework specifically. In chapter 5, for instance, we speculated 
about the difference between causal and non-causal relations in generative models 
and in chapter 2 we suggested that links between levels in the hierarchy have a causal 
interpretation. Future research is needed to further investigate these ideas. Further 
insights may be gained from developmental studies, as these could potentially illuminate 
the role of causal knowledge in the way in which generative models develop. For instance, 
infants may not have the rich generative models required to understand the causality of 
a situation, so one could wonder how they come to acquire this understanding in the 
first place. Interestingly, however, it seems that even rats possess a basic understanding 
of causality (Blaisdell, Sawa, Leising, & Waldmann, 2006) and some have suggested that 
children are born with innate assumptions about causality (Gopnik et al., 2004; Spelke, 
Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992). More research on the way in which learning to 
associate two events depends on knowledge about the causal structure of the situation 
is key to our understanding of the generative models underlying our predictions and, 
as such, to our understanding of how predictive processing could support action 
understanding. 
Another direction that would be relevant for future research concerns the view that 
predictive processing provides a unifying framework of brain functioning. It has been 
proposed to explain a wide range of cognitive processes and alterations in these processes 
that may give rise to disorders such as autism spectrum disorders (e.g. Palmer, Seth, & 
Hohwy, 2015; Pellicano & Burr, 2012) and schizophrenia (e.g. Fletcher & Frith, 2009). It 
would be interesting to see how far the explanatory power of the framework reaches. We 
may distinguish to qualitatively different approaches for doing this: (1) one could start 
at the bottom of the hierarchy by investigating whether specific neural responses are 
consistent with predictive processing (e.g. Bastos et al., 2012; Kok, Bains, van Mourik, 
Norris, & de Lange, 2016) and move up from there or (2) start at the top of the hierarchy 
by investigating whether cognitive processes can potentially be explained by predictive 
processing (e.g. Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013) and move down from there. In this thesis, I 
have taken a perspective that can inform the latter approach. As suggested earlier, 
this approach faces the challenge of coming up with critical tests of the assumptions 
made. The bottom-up perspective, on the other hand, faces the challenge of scaling up 
from lower to higher cognitive levels. If we want to figure out if predictive processing 
can indeed explain processing in the entire cognitive hierarchy, we will need research 
focusing on both directions and thus addressing both challenges. 
SOCIETAL RELEVANCE
A better understanding of the way in which people process and predict the actions of 
others, may also provide insights of relevance for a range of societal issues. The view 
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that brains are essentially prediction machines that learn from prediction errors may, for 
instance, improve our understanding of the way in which our judgements about others 
are influenced by stereotypes. The idea that information about social groups, including 
stereotypes, influences our judgements and even perception of others is generally 
accepted. However, understanding that this information is represented in generative 
models that provide us with predictions of people’s actions and performance offers a 
clearer picture and may eventually even pave the way for better methods to overcome 
the negative impact of stereotyping. Such methods could help increase equality and 
avoid the automatic negative evaluations of people who act in a way that does not match 
stereotype images (Flannigan, Miles, Quadflieg, & Macrae, 2013). 
Furthermore, the view suggested in this thesis may shed light on educational me-
thods in two ways. First, if prediction errors are indeed essential for learning or, in 
terms of predictive processing, the improvement of generative models, then it seems 
important to create learning materials and methods that cause prediction errors. 
According to the learning progress hypothesis, the experience of learning progress (i.e. 
a reduction in prediction errors) can be intrinsically rewarding. It therefore leads to 
curiosity, which then fosters learning. This results in a positive feedback loop between 
curiosity and learning (Oudeyer, Gottlieb, & Lopes, 2016). In education, it then seems key 
to get children to generate predictions in order for them to experience learning progress. 
Second, the idea that learning that two events are related is more effective in case there 
is a clear causal relation between the events, highlights the importance of understanding 
the mechanisms behind their occurrence.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The aim of this thesis was to investigate how people process other people’s actions and 
the outcomes of these actions. The research presented here points towards an integrative 
view. It suggests that, in principle, all aspects investigated here can be understood within 
the predictive processing framework. Our findings were in line with the idea that action 
outcomes that are unexpected given a person’s characteristics result in prediction 
errors and that these prediction errors are, at least in part, explained away in brain areas 
typically associated with social-cognitive processes. Furthermore, they suggest that 
predictions about action outcomes arise in generative models that have a hierarchical 
structure and incorporate knowledge about whether or not factors are causally related 
to the action outcome. As proposed earlier, the way in which generative models are 
developed and improved may largely follow the principles suggested by associative 
accounts of learning, complemented with principles that take causal knowledge into 
account. Finally, they suggest that the generative models that aid the processing of 
actions and their outcomes do not only represent knowledge about individuals, but also 
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about the social group they belong to, as members of one’s own social group seem to 
be represented more positively than members of another social group. Together, these 
findings suggest that the predictive processing framework cannot only explain low-level 
processes, but also more abstract social-cognitive processes such as those involved in 
action processing. However, future research would need to further explicate different 
aspects of the framework in order to compare it to alternative accounts and determine 
whether it would indeed be able to serve as a unifying account of brain functioning.
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Nederlandse samenvatting
In ons dagelijks leven zien we mensen om ons heen vaak allerlei soorten bewegingen 
maken. Stel je bijvoorbeeld eens voor dat je een vriendin ziet koken. Je ziet haar groenten 
snijden, een pan op het vuur zetten en door een saus roeren. In de tussentijd verwerk je 
al deze informatie: misschien vraag je je af wat je vriendin precies gaat maken, wat je 
zou kunnen doen om haar te helpen en of het gerecht lekker zal worden. Je hersenen 
komen met allerlei informatie om hierbij te helpen. Ze herinneren je eraan wat er de 
vorige keer gebeurde toen ze kookte en activeren kennis over bijvoorbeeld smaken en 
kooktechnieken. Daardoor begrijp je bijvoorbeeld meteen dat ze wil dat je een snufje 
van het zout waar ze naar wijst toevoegt aan de saus en verwacht je een heerlijk gerecht 
omdat je weet dat ze goed kan koken. 
 In een situatie als deze, maar ook in vele andere situaties, verwerken we infor-
matie over het gedrag van anderen. Hoewel we dit meestal doen zonder dat we ons ervan 
bewust zijn, is deze vaardigheid cruciaal voor succesvolle sociale interactie. Het helpt ons 
niet alleen om te begrijpen wat er om ons heel gebeurt, maar ook om te voorspellen wat 
er daarna gaat gebeuren en hoe we ons eigen gedrag daaraan kunnen aanpassen. Door 
het gemak waarmee we dit doen lijkt het misschien eenvoudig, maar als onderzoekers 
begrijpen we nog relatief weinig van de sociaal-cognitieve processen die bij dit type 
verwerking betrokken zijn. Er moeten namelijk diverse soorten informatie geïntegreerd 
worden om te begrijpen waarom iemand een bepaalde handeling uitvoert en om zijn of 
haar volgende handeling te voorspellen. Het is dan bijvoorbeeld relevant om te weten 
wat die persoon daarvóór gedaan heeft, tot welke sociale groep hij of zij behoort en in 
welke context de handeling plaatsvond. Als we deze processen beter zouden begrijpen, 
dan zouden we niet alleen meer te weten komen over de werking van onze hersenen in 
het algemeen, maar ook over aandoeningen die ervoor zorgen dat mensen problemen 
ervaren met de verwerking van de bewegingen van anderen, zoals autisme of schizofrenie.
 Daarom onderzocht ik in dit proefschrift of de snelheid waarmee we handelingen 
van anderen kunnen verwerken, en het neurale mechanisme dat hieraan ten grondslag 
ligt, uitgelegd kan worden vanuit de predictive processing theorie, die volgens diverse 
onderzoekers een algemene verklaring biedt voor de werking van de hersenen. Volgens de 
predictive processing theorie wordt informatie die binnenkomt via onze zintuigen steeds 
vergeleken met voorspellingen die ontstaan in cognitieve modellen. Als voorspellingen 
en binnenkomende informatie niet overeenkomen, ontstaan er voorspellingsfouten die 
in de hersenen opgelost moeten worden en dus extra verwerking vereisen. Het gevolg 
daarvan zou zijn dat de verwerking van verwachte gebeurtenissen sneller en efficiënter 
verloopt dan die van onverwachte gebeurtenissen. 
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De verschillende hoofdstukken in dit proefschrift beschrijven vier studies waarin we 
onderzochten of deze theorie inderdaad een verklaring kan bieden voor verschillende 
aspecten van de verwerking van de bewegingen van mensen om ons heen. Voor elke 
studie formuleerden en toetsten we hypothesen over de mogelijke eigenschappen 
van de cognitieve modellen die voorspellingen voortbrengen. We maakten gebruik 
van een experimenteel paradigma waarin proefpersonen keken naar animatiefilmpjes 
van mensen die bowlen. Op basis van verschillende soorten kennis, bijvoorbeeld over 
de spelers zelf, bouwden proefpersonen cognitieve modellen op die zorgden voor 
verwachtingen over de score die de spelers waarschijnlijk zouden behalen. 
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt een studie beschreven waarin we onderzochten of proef-
personen kennis over het vaardigheidsniveau van individuele spelers gebruiken bij 
het verwerken van uitkomsten van de bewegingen van die persoon. Ze zagen een 
ervaren of onervaren speler een hoge of lage score behalen en beantwoordden vragen 
over de speler of de score. We namen aan dat scores die onverwacht zijn op basis van 
kennis over de speler – zoals wanneer een onervaren speler een hoge score behaalt – 
zouden resulteren in voorspellingsfouten, die op hun beurt zouden leiden tot langere 
reactietijden. De resultaten toonden aan dat reacties op vragen volgend op onverwachte 
scores inderdaad langer op zich lieten wachten. Dit was specifiek het geval voor vragen 
over de speler, in overeenstemming met het idee dat deze informatie op een hoger 
niveau gerepresenteerd wordt dan informatie over de score. Een onverwachte score 
leidt volgens de theorie namelijk tot een voorspellingsfout die verwerkt wordt op een 
hoger niveau, in dit geval het niveau waarop informatie over de speler verwerkt wordt. 
Die verwerking zou er dan voor zorgen dat het langer duurt om informatie over de speler 
op te halen. Dit patroon zagen we niet in een vervolgexperiment waarin voorspellingen 
niet gebaseerd konden worden op kennis over de speler, maar op een gekleurd vak dat de 
kans op een hoge of lage score aangaf. We concludeerden dat een predictive processing 
model met een hiërarchische structuur en causale relaties tussen de niveaus in staat was 
het patroon van reactietijden in een set van drie experimenten te verklaren. 
In de fMRI studie die beschreven wordt in hoofdstuk 3 voerden proefpersonen 
dezelfde taak uit als in de vorige studie. We zagen dat onverwachte scores zorgden voor 
extra activiteit in de hersenen, die mogelijk nodig was voor het verwerken van voor-
spellingsfouten. Deze activiteit kwam voor een deel overeen met activiteit die we zagen 
tijdens een theory-of-mind taak. Dit suggereert dat voorspellingsfouten verwerkt worden 
in hersengebieden die vaak geassocieerd worden met sociaal-cognitieve verwerking en 
daarmee ook dat de predictive processing theorie mogelijk niet alleen het patroon van 
activatie verklaart in gebieden die betrokken zijn bij basale verwerking, maar ook in 
gebieden die betrokken zijn bij meer complexe, abstracte verwerking.   
Hoofdstuk 4 beschrijft vervolgens een studie waarin we onderzochten of de 
cognitieve modellen die voorspellingen voortbrengen over de prestaties van anderen 
verschillen voor leden van onze eigen sociale group (de ‘ingroup’) en die van een andere 
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sociale groep (de ‘outgroup’). Proefpersonen zagen leden van hun eigen en een ander 
team bowlen en voorspelden welke score elke speler zou behalen. De resultaten laten 
zien dat proefpersonen in staat waren scores van spelers van zowel hun eigen als het 
andere team te voorspellen, maar toch de prestaties van hun eigen team overschatten. 
Dat zou betekenen onze cognitieve modellen niet alleen informatie representeren over 
individuen, maar ook over de sociale groepen waartoe die individuen behoren. De 
resultaten suggeren daarnaast dat de overschatting van onze eigen sociale groep blijft 
bestaan wanneer we meer kennis opdoen over mensen uit andere sociale groepen. 
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt ten slotte een studie beschreven waarin onderzocht werd hoe 
kennis over verschillende soorten causale factoren in de omgeving gerepresenteerd 
worden in cognitieve modellen. In de bowlinganimaties die proefpersonen zagen waren 
steeds aanwijzingen te zien die de score voorspelden. Deze aanwijzingen waren gekoppeld 
aan factoren waarvan we aannamen dat ze wel (in het eerste experiment) of juist niet (in 
de volgende experimenten) gezien zouden kunnen worden als ondersteunende factoren 
in de causale keten van gebeurtenissen. In het eerste experiment was de aanwijzing 
bijvoorbeeld de kleur van de bowlingbaan, die gezien zou kunnen worden als een 
indicatie van de kwaliteit van de baan, terwijl de aanwijzing in het laatste experiment 
een gekleurd vak was dat los stond van de bowlingbaan en de speler. We verwachtten 
dat voorspellingen over een gebeurtenis gebaseerd worden op kennis over factoren die 
de gebeurtenis veroorzaken of op een andere manier een rol spelen is de causale keten. 
De resultaten suggereren echter dat geen van de situaties causaal geïnterpreteerd werd, 
maar dat proefpersonen toch in staat waren om de aanwijzingen te gebruiken bij het 
voorspellen van de score. Mogelijk betekent dit dat niet-causale factoren opgenomen 
kunnen worden in causale modellen, maar dat dit minder makkelijk gebeurt of ze dan 
minder voorspellende kracht hebben. 
Deze studies samen ondersteunen het idee dat voorspellingen over de uitkomsten 
van handelingen van mensen om ons heen ontstaan in cognitieve modellen met een 
hiërarchische structuur en die kennis bevatten over individuen, hun sociale groep en 
de causale relaties tussen gebeurtenissen. Daarnaast suggereren ze dat uitkomsten van 
handelingen die onverwacht zijn op basis van de kennis die we hebben over de persoon 
die de handeling uitvoert, zorgen voor voorspellingsfouten die, in elk geval voor een deel, 
verwerkt worden in hersengebieden die geassocieerd worden met sociaal-cognitieve 
processen. 
 In het afsluitende hoofdstuk wordt besproken dat deze bevindingen in lijn zijn 
met andere theorieën over sociaal-cognitieve verwerking. Eén voorbeeld daarvan zijn 
associatieve theorieën, die ervan uitgaan dat associaties gevormd worden wanneer twee 
gebeurtenissen gelijktijdig plaatsvinden en vaak ook dat dit specifiek gebeurt wanneer 
er door dat geblijktijdig plaatsvinden een voorspellingsfout onstaat. Volgens sommigen 
wordt dit proces gedeeltelijk gestuurd door de kennis die mensen hebben over de 
causale structuur van de wereld: begrijpen waarom A leidt tot B, zorgt ervoor dat we B 
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beter kunnen voorspellen op basis van A. Samen zouden deze theorieën een verklaring 
kunnen bieden voor de manier waarop cognitieve modellen opgebouwd worden.  
 Geconcludeerd wordt dat de predictive processing theorie een verklaring kan 
bieden voor de relatief abstacte social-cognitieve processen die betrokken zijn bij het 
verwerken van het gedrag van mensen om ons heen. Diverse aspecten moeten echter 
verder uitgewerkt worden, zodat de theorie beter vergeleken kan worden met andere 
theorieën. Het is nu bijvoorbeeld nog onbekend hoe abstracte informatie gerepresenteerd 
wordt in de hersenen en of de niveaus in de cognitieve modellen overeenkomen met 
specifieke hersengebieden. Als deze en andere aspecten verder uitgewerkt zijn en 
bepaald kan worden of predictive processing inderdaad de algemene werking van de 
hersenen zou kunnen verklaren. 
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